). Israel was given international guarantees of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran. Israel has repeatedly officially stated that it will consider the resumption of the blockade of the strait as a pretext for war. Egyptian leaders and UN representatives interpreted the status of UN troops differently. Egypt believed that the UN should withdraw troops from Sinai at the first request of the Egyptian government, while UN Secretary General D. Hammarskjöld argued that an agreement had been reached between him and Egyptian President G. A. Nasser that if Egypt demanded the withdrawal of UN troops , “the matter must be immediately referred to the General Assembly” for its final decision. In 1960, under the influence of Nasser, extremist nationalist sentiments intensified in Arab countries. On March 8, 1963, after the extremist wing of the left-wing nationalist Baath Party came to power in Syria, the situation on the Syrian-Israeli border, which had previously been tense (for example, in 1957-62, Israel filed complaints to the UN 462 times because violations of the ceasefire terms by Syria) has become even more aggravated. The Syrian leadership sought to deprive Israel of part of its water resources. In 1964, when the construction of the all-Israeli water pipeline was being completed, Syria invited the Arab countries to start a war against Israel in order to prevent the completion of this project. At a meeting of leaders of Arab countries (Casablanca, January 1964), this plan was rejected, but a decision was made to divert the sources of the Jordan - the Dan, Hermon (Banias), Snir (Hasbani) rivers - into a canal leading to a reservoir on the Yarmouk River in Jordan, which was to deprive Israel of most of the waters of the Jordan. Israel stated that all this would lead to a sharp decrease in the water level of Lake Kinneret, and it would consider the implementation of this plan as a casus belli. The route of the canal under construction in 1965–66. Israel has been subjected to repeated shelling and air bombing. This forced the Syrians to stop construction, but Syria continued provocations on the border. Thus, on August 15, 1966, Israeli police boats were attacked on Kinneret; in response, Israeli fighters shot down two Syrian planes over the lake (for more details, see Syria). Terrorist actions against Israel were also carried out by militants from Fatah (Palestine Liberation Organization; PLO), which was actively supported by Arab countries, especially Egypt.
On November 4, 1966, Syria and Egypt entered into a military alliance. Attacks on Israel from Syria have intensified. On April 7, 1967, Israeli aircraft shot down six enemy military aircraft in Syrian airspace. On May 10, the Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Army, General I. Rabin, said that if the provocations do not stop, Israeli troops will attack Damascus and overthrow the regime of Syrian President N. Atasi.
Israel was confronted by a powerful coalition of countries with a significant superiority of armed forces, both in the number of soldiers and weapons, and in the quality of military equipment.
Tsakh al(Israel Defense Forces). The strength of the Egyptian army was 240 thousand people, tanks - 1200, aircraft - 450; Syria - fifty thousand people, 400 tanks, 120 aircraft; Iraq - seventy thousand people, 400 tanks, 200 aircraft. Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Arab countries announced their readiness to provide military contingents for the war with Israel. After the mobilization of Tsakhala, Israel numbered 264 thousand people, 800 tanks, 300 aircraft. The main threat to Israel was the strike force of Egyptian troops located in Sinai, numbering about one hundred thousand people and more than 800 tanks (mostly Soviet-made). The government and people of Israel understood what a terrible threat loomed over the country. On May 20, reservists were mobilized. Israel hoped that the United States of America, England (see Great Britain), France, as guarantors of freedom of navigation of Israeli ships in the Strait of Tiran, would be able to achieve the lifting of the Egyptian blockade. On May 23, US President L. Johnson said that the blockade is an illegal act and that the United States is determined to guarantee the territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East. England put its warships in the Mediterranean on alert. Britain and the United States stated that the strait should be open to international shipping and that “possible military action should not be ruled out.” But the trip of Israeli Foreign Minister A. Even to the USA, England and France showed Israel that the state can only rely on itself. Thus, the President of France, Charles de Gaulle, in the form of an ultimatum, demanded that Israel not be the first to begin military operations. The leaders of England and the United States, expressing support for Israel, talked about the need to send an international squadron to open the Strait of Tiran, but did not take on any specific obligations.
The threat of war and Israel's isolation in the international arena increased tension in the country. Representatives of various political forces demanded to expand the ruling coalition (see State of Israel. Political life, parties) and introduce M. Dayan and D. Ben-Gurion into the government. The Rafi party, led by D. Ben-Gurion and S. Peres, especially insisted on this, as well as the Gahal bloc (consisting of Herut and the United Liberal Party /see Liberal Party in Israel/) led by M. Begin. On June 1, M. Dayan entered the government as Minister of Defense and M. Begin - minister without portfolio; on June 4 - I. Sapir (see Sapir, family) - minister without portfolio. On the same day, the government decided to attack the Egyptian army in the Sinai Peninsula. To make the Israeli strike unexpected for the enemy, the command carried out a number of measures: on June 3, thousands of Israeli soldiers received leave. Photos of Israeli soldiers relaxing on the beaches circulated in the press all over the world, and M. Dayan said: “The government, even before I joined it, turned to diplomacy, we must give it a chance.”
Air strike. The offensive began on Monday June 5 with an attack by Israeli Air Force aircraft on Egyptian military airfields. Israeli intelligence has determined that the most convenient time for an attack is 7 hours 45 minutes (favorable meteorological conditions: the fog is dissipating; Egyptian pilots are just heading to the planes; there is not a single fighter on duty in the air). The Israeli planes flew very low and were not noticed by either Soviet radars (on military ships) or Egyptian ones. The Israeli air force, with a relatively small number of aircraft, continuously attacked ten Egyptian military airfields during the first three hours of hostilities. This became possible thanks to the high professionalism of Israeli pilots and the coordinated work of the Air Force ground services. It took the Israelis 57 minutes to complete a combat mission, including return, refueling and aircraft inspection, while the Egyptians needed about two hours. Israeli planes made several passes over the target, trying to achieve a more accurate hit. As a result, during the first hours of the war, Egyptian aviation ceased to exist as a serious combat force capable of supporting ground forces. By the end of the second day of the war, Egyptian aviation had lost 309 aircraft and helicopters, including all 30 TU-16 long-range bombers.
On the same day, Syrian aircraft attacked an Israeli military airfield near Megiddo, where they destroyed several mock-ups, then Israeli aircraft attacked Syrian airfields. By the end of the first day of the war, 60 Syrian aircraft had been destroyed. Jordanian planes attacked the Israeli air base in Kfar Sirkin and destroyed a transport plane. The Israelis attacked Jordanian air bases, and by the end of the second day of the war, Jordan had lost 40 aircraft. Despite the fact that Egyptian aviation had aircraft that were superior to Israeli aircraft in their technical and tactical performance, 50 Egyptian MIGs were shot down in air battles; Israel did not lose a single Mirage. The brilliant victory of the Israeli Air Force predetermined the outcome of the war.
The first day of fighting on land. Three Israeli divisions under the command of generals I. Tal (1924–2010), A. Joffe (1913–83), A. Sharon attacked the Egyptian army in Sinai.
At 8 o'clock, the 15th division of General I. Tal began an offensive in the north of Sinai towards Khan Yunis, where the line of defense was held by soldiers of the 20th Palestinian division, which was part of the Egyptian army. After a heavy battle, during which 35 Israeli tank commanders were killed, the Palestinian front was broken and Israeli troops launched an offensive towards Rafah (Rafah) and El Arish. The offensive had to be carried out, overcoming active Egyptian resistance, storming numerous fortified positions. During the fighting near Rafah, one of the Israeli battalions was surrounded and repelled attacks by an entire Egyptian brigade for several hours until help arrived. By the end of the first day of the war, the 7th Egyptian Division defending Rafah El Arish was defeated. On the night of June 5-6, the last pockets of Egyptian defense in the El-Arish area were suppressed.
A. Ioffe's division, significantly south of the scene of action of General I. Tal's division, launched an offensive through the dunes to the Egyptian fortified position at Bir Lahfan. The Israelis were advancing on a section of the front where there were no fortified Egyptian positions. At 18:00, the Israelis occupied Bir Lahfan, cutting off the road along which the Egyptians could transfer reinforcements from the central sector of the front to El-Arish. On the evening of June 5, the Egyptian tank and part of the motorized brigade were sent from Jabal Libni to El Arish. They came across the division of A. Ioffe in the Bir Lakhfan area; the battle continued all night; Egyptian units suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat.
The division of General A. Sharon at 9 o'clock in the morning began advancing on the southern sector of the front to the fortified Egyptian position of Abu Agheila. The fortification consisted of three concrete lines of trenches with tanks, anti-tank guns and mine fortifications between them. At 22:45, six artillery divisions opened fire on the Egyptian positions, and the assault began half an hour later. The main role was played by tank units and a battalion of paratroopers. At 6 a.m. on June 6, the last pockets of Egyptian resistance were suppressed. Abu Ageila was completely occupied by A. Sharon's division.
L. Eshkol on the morning of June 5, shortly before the start of the Israeli air attack, through the Canadian General O. Bull (commander of the UN observers in the Jerusalem area), sent a message to King Hussein: “We will not take any action against Jordan. But if Jordan launches military action, we will respond with all our might, and he [Hussein] will have to bear full responsibility.” Despite the warning, at 8:30 a.m. on June 5, the Jordanians opened fire along the border line in Jerusalem; At 11:30 a.m., fire was exchanged along the entire Israeli-Jordanian border. On the morning of June 5, the commander of the Central Front, U. Narkis (1925–97), asked I. Rabin to allow front troops to attack a number of targets in Jerusalem and around the city, but was refused. At 1 p.m., Jordanian soldiers occupied the UN headquarters in Jerusalem, which was guarded by several Israeli police. Soon after a heavy battle, the residence was recaptured by the Israelis. To strengthen Israeli troops in the Jerusalem area, a brigade of paratroopers under the command of M. Gura was sent to the city, which was planned to be dropped behind the lines of Egyptian troops, but due to the rapid advance of Israeli troops on the Southern Front, it was decided to abandon this plan. At 2:30 a.m., Israeli artillery began shelling the main stronghold of Jordanian troops in Jerusalem - Giv'at Ha-Tahmoshet, which was dominated by the building of the former police school. The battle for Giv'at-kh a-Tahmoshet was very difficult. The position was perfectly fortified; the Israeli command did not know about the large number of bunkers in which Jordanian soldiers were located. During the fighting in Jerusalem, U. Narkis allowed the use of aviation, tanks, and artillery in limited quantities in order to avoid civilian casualties and not cause damage to the historical monuments of Jerusalem. The Jordanian soldiers defended themselves with incredible tenacity, often engaging in hand-to-hand combat. The Israeli paratrooper brigade suffered heavy losses.
Israeli troops occupied a number of fortified points around Jerusalem to prevent Jordanian reinforcements from being transferred to the city. After a battle that lasted several hours, the tank brigade captured the village of Beit Iksa between Ramallah (see Ramallah) and Jerusalem; A Jordanian tank unit en route to Jerusalem on June 6 at 6 a.m. was ambushed and suffered heavy losses. Jordanian tank and motorized units were practically unable to move due to frequent bombing by Israeli aircraft. On the morning of June 6, paratroopers occupied Latrun, the Jordanian soldiers and Egyptian commandos defending the monastery retreated without offering resistance.
The second day of fighting on the Southern Front. Liberation of Jerusalem and defeat of the Jordanian army. On the morning of June 6, one part of General I. Tal’s division launched an attack to the northwest, towards the Suez Canal. The other part moved south, to the Jabal-Libni area, which they were supposed to capture together with the soldiers of General A. Ioffe. Jabal Libni was taken as a result of a joint attack by soldiers of two Israeli divisions. Another infantry brigade of I. Tal's division, reinforced with tank units and paratroopers, occupied Gaza by noon.
On the Central Front, Israeli troops continued operations to liberate Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordanian forces. The tank brigade of Colonel W. Ben-Ari (1925–2009) began the assault on Ramallah. At 19:00 the city was occupied by the Israelis. On the same day, the troops of the Northern Front under the command of General D. El'azar launched an offensive on the west bank of the Jordan River. On the night of June 6-7, D. El'azar's troops captured Jenin. The Israelis continued their advance towards Nablus, misleading the Jordanian command about the direction of the attack. Israeli units occupied positions north of Nablus before the arrival of Jordanian troops. An attempt by Jordanian soldiers to dislodge the Israelis from these positions was repulsed. On the night of June 7–8, Nablus passed into the hands of the Israelis.
The fighting in Jerusalem did not stop day or night. After the capture of Giv'at-kh a-Tahmoshet, M. Gur's paratroopers continued the offensive. At 6 o'clock on Tuesday morning the Ambassador Hotel was occupied, and fighting began for the American Colony Hotel and the Rockefeller Museum. Israeli soldiers came under intense fire from the walls of the Old City. At 10 a.m. on June 6, the entire area around the walls of the Old City was occupied by the Israelis. But I. Rabin and M. Dayan did not give permission to begin the assault on the Old City. It was ordered to occupy the heights dominating Jerusalem. Paratroopers captured the Augusta Victoria Church and a number of other heights. At 5 o'clock in the morning on June 7, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General H. Bar-Lev, gave permission to U. Narkis to storm the Old City. At the same time, he emphasized that we need to hurry: “They are already putting pressure on us to stop hostilities.” The Israeli command gave orders not to cause damage to holy places when shelling the walls of the Old City. At 9 o'clock in the morning on June 7, paratroopers led by M. Gur burst into the Old Town through the St. Stephen's Gate. A unit of the Jerusalem Brigade entered the Old City through the Garbage Gate. Before the start of the assault, M. Gur addressed the soldiers: “We will be the first to enter it. Israel is waiting. This is a historic moment." A heavy battle took place on the Temple Mount, where several dozen soldiers settled in the Omar Mosque and met the paratroopers with fire. At 2 p.m. M. Dayan, I. Rabin and U. Narkis walked through the Old City to the Western Wall (see Western Wall).
By the evening of June 7, Israeli troops captured the entire territory of the West Bank of the Jordan River. Israeli planes continuously bombed Jordanian units, as a result of which the roads were blocked by broken military equipment and movement along them became impossible. The Jordanians were also forced to abandon many tanks and armored personnel carriers that ran out of fuel.
The Jordanian army offered more active resistance to the Israelis than the armies of Egypt and Syria. During the fighting with Jordanian units, 180 Israeli soldiers were killed (most in Jerusalem).
Continuation of fighting on the Southern Front. The defeat of the Egyptian army. On the morning of June 6, Israeli troops on the Southern Front continued their offensive. The division of General I. Tal was supposed to take the Egyptian fortified point of Bir al-Hamma, then occupy Bir Gafgafa and block the road for the Egyptian troops to retreat north to Ismailia. The soldiers of General A. Ioffe moved along the Southern Road to the Mitla Pass. They were supposed to block the only road for the retreat of Egyptian vehicles. A. Sharon's units were supposed to take Nakhl, storm the Mitla pass and drive the Egyptian troops into the trap that A. Joffe and I. Tal had prepared for them. General Tal's troops took Bir al-Khamm. While advancing on Bir Gafgafa, the Israeli column was ambushed by Egyptian heavy tanks. Having lost several tanks, the Israelis broke through and blocked the road to Ismailia north of Bir Gafgafa. At 9 o'clock on Wednesday morning, A. Joffe's soldiers occupied Bir Hasne. A. Ioffe described the actions of his soldiers: “We rushed like crazy into the passage between the mountains, called the Mitla Pass... It was ordered to surround the enemy forces and delay their retreat to the canal.” An advance detachment consisting of two tank battalions was sent to the pass. Under enemy fire, carrying seven tanks on steel cables that had run out of fuel, Israeli tanks took up positions on the pass.
The division of General A. Sharon, advancing from Abu Agail to Nakhl, came across Egyptian heavy tanks abandoned by soldiers. In the battles for Nahl, Egyptian troops suffered huge losses, about a thousand killed (A. Sharon called the battle area “the valley of death”).
The Egyptians were surrounded in the Mitla Pass area; they were continuously bombed from the air and attacked by tanks from all directions; they tried to get to the canal in small groups or alone. Some units maintained battle formation and tried to overcome Israeli ambushes. So, on Wednesday evening, the Egyptian brigade tried to break through in the area north of Bir Gafgafa. Egyptian troops with tanks from Ismailia came to her aid. Two Israeli infantry battalions with light tanks fought all night, repelled attacks and held out until reinforcements arrived.
Thousands of Egyptian vehicles, despite frantic bombing, continued to advance towards the Mitla Pass, not knowing that it was in Israeli hands. The Egyptians sought to break through at any cost; on Wednesday, June 7 at 10 pm they managed to surround one of the brigades of General A. Ioffe at the pass. After a stubborn night battle, the Egyptian units were defeated. On Thursday, June 8, the divisions of A. Ioffe and I. Tal rushed to the canal. In the evening, I. Tal’s soldiers, during a difficult battle, during which about a hundred Israeli tanks were destroyed, reached the canal opposite Ismailia. On Friday at 2 o'clock in the afternoon A. Ioffe's soldiers came out to the canal.
On the night of June 8-9, the Egyptian government agreed to a truce. By this time, the 100,000-strong Egyptian army was defeated. Thousands of Egyptian soldiers wandered towards the canal without food or water; there were about ten thousand killed, about five thousand prisoners (although the Israelis, as a rule, took only officers prisoner, and soldiers were often helped to reach the canal).
Fighting on the Syrian front. The Syrians began military operations against Israel on land on June 6. The bulk of Israeli troops operated in the south against Egypt and Jordan; The Syrians concentrated 11 brigades on the border, but did not attack Israeli positions, limiting themselves to artillery shelling of Israeli settlements. On June 7 and 8, Israeli troops operating against Jordan began to move towards the border with Syria. Over the 19 years since the end of the War of Independence, the Syrian troops who occupied the dominant heights have created a powerful line of fortifications. The commander of one of the Israeli divisions, General E. Peled (born in 1927), recalled: “These fortifications went more than ten miles deep. There was no so-called first, second or third line of defense: only continuous fortifications and firing positions, row after row.” 250 artillery pieces were placed in the positions. Early on the morning of Thursday, June 8, Israeli aircraft began bombing the Syrian defense line. The bombing continued continuously until the end of the fighting. Although the heaviest bombs used by the Israelis were unable to penetrate the lining of the bunkers, the bombing damaged the morale of the Syrian soldiers and many of them fled the bunkers.
On Friday June 9, at 11:30 am, Israeli troops went on the offensive. The Israeli command was in a hurry to defeat the Syrians before the ceasefire agreement came into force. Israeli soldiers carried out the main attacks on the northern and southern sectors of the front. In the north, a group of troops consisting of a tank brigade, parachute, motorized rifle units and sappers went on the offensive. The Israelis were advancing on one of the most impregnable positions - the Golan plateau. Under fire from dug-in Syrian tanks and suffering heavy losses, the Israeli vanguard took Syrian positions. Following this, infantry units attacked Tel Azaziyat, Tel el-Fakhr, Bourj Braville and, after a fierce battle, occupied them. The heaviest battle was in Tel el-Fakhr, where there was a powerful defensive position. The battle lasted three hours and was fought, according to General D. El'azar, “with fists, knives and rifle butts.”
At the time when the main group of Israeli troops went on the offensive, an auxiliary attack was launched in the area of \u200b\u200bGonen and Ashmura, on the central sector of the Syrian front. In the direction of the main attack, the Israeli tank group launched an attack on the city of Quneitra, the main point of Syrian defense. The Golani Brigade stormed another strong point, Banias. On Saturday at 13:00 the Israelis surrounded Quneitra, and at 14:30 it was taken.
At dawn on June 10, on the southern sector of the front, Israeli troops under the command of General E. Peled began an offensive. Israeli commandos were landed behind the Syrians. The Syrian troops were defeated. On Saturday, at 19:30, after a repeated call from the UN Security Council, the parties agreed to a ceasefire. On June 10, Israeli forces occupied the western and southern parts of the Hermon mountain range. During the fighting, nine Syrian brigades were defeated (two brigades did not take part in the battles and were withdrawn to Damascus), more than a thousand soldiers were killed, and a huge amount of military equipment was captured. The path to Damascus was open. General D. El'azar stated: “I think it would have taken us 36 hours to enter this city.” Israeli losses amounted to 115 people killed.
Attitudes to the Six-Day War of governments and public opinion in various countries of the world. Results of the Six Day War. The outbreak of hostilities caused a controversial reaction in the world. The Arab countries and the Soviet Union took the most hostile position towards Israel, although the statements of Soviet officials were restrained, since the Soviet leadership, misled by Nasser’s false statements about the victories of the Egyptian army, had no real idea of what was actually happening. But already on the first day of the war, the Soviet media accused Israel of aggression against Egypt, and TASS stated that the Soviet government “reserves the right to take any actions that the situation may require.” Nevertheless, on June 5, Chairman of the Council of Ministers A. Kosygin sent a telegram to US President L. Johnson saying that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Arab-Israeli conflict if the United States did not intervene. As soon as the Soviet leaders received objective information about the course of hostilities, they sharply tightened their anti-Israeli position. On June 7, the Soviet representative in the Security Council proposed a ceasefire resolution at 8 pm and stated that the Soviet Union would sever diplomatic relations with Israel if it refused to comply with the terms of the resolution. This proposal was rejected by Arab countries. The Soviet Union made sharp anti-Israeli statements, threatening to interfere in the course of hostilities. The movement of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean Sea towards the conflict area was observed, and in a number of southern military districts the transfer of military units to airfields and ports began. Readiness number one was declared in some airborne units. On the evening of June 8, speaking at the Security Council, Soviet representative K. Fedorenko said: “Israel bears responsibility for the crimes committed and must be punished with all severity.” On June 10, the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. Soviet representatives submitted a number of proposals to the UN Security Council in which Israel was named an aggressor, but these proposals were rejected by a majority vote. In July 1967, speaking at a UN session, A. Kosygin compared the actions of the Israeli military against the Arab population with the actions of Wehrmacht soldiers. Since August 1967, a continuous flow of weapons began to flow into Egypt and Syria from the Soviet Union, including the latest models of Soviet tanks, aircraft, and missiles. These revenues not only compensated for the losses of the Arab countries, but made them more powerful in terms of the quantity and quality of weapons than before the Six-Day War.
On June 5, 11 Arab countries declared their solidarity with Egypt. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia provided enormous financial assistance to Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Arab countries announced sending military contingents to the front, but these troops were never sent to Egypt, Syria, Jordan. The representations of England and the United States were destroyed in various Arab countries; Jewish pogroms occurred in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and some other countries. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates temporarily stopped selling oil to England and the United States. Despite the Israeli government's appeal to the Arab countries for the immediate start of peace negotiations, Arab leaders at the Khartoum conference declared a triple "no" to the Israeli proposal: "... there will be no peace with Israel, there will be no recognition of Israel, there will be no negotiations with Israel " Arab countries supported the PLO's terrorist struggle against Israel.
After the start of the war, French President Charles de Gaulle took a sharply anti-Israeli position, despite the active support of Israel by broad sections of the French public and various political forces. In 1968, France imposed an arms embargo on Israel.
Since the beginning of the conflict, Jews around the world have expressed solidarity with Israel. Western Jews provided Israel with great financial assistance; thousands of Jews turned to Israeli embassies with a request to help them get to the front. The victory of the Israeli army contributed to the awakening of national consciousness among many Soviet Jews and the emergence of a Jewish national movement in the Soviet Union.
The high morale of the Israeli army, the excellent training of soldiers and officers, the talented leadership of military operations by the senior command staff under the leadership of I. Rabin and M. Dayan, complete air supremacy, achieved already in the first hours of the war, were the key to Israeli victory.
Israel won one of the greatest victories in its history in the Six Day War. The armies of three Arab countries were defeated, losing more than fifteen thousand killed, and about six thousand soldiers and officers were captured. Israel lost 777 people killed.
As a result of the Six-Day War, united Jerusalem became the capital of Israel, and the Golan Heights, which are of strategic importance, were annexed to Israel. Sinai and the West Bank of the Jordan River came under Israeli control, which subsequently made it possible to negotiate and conclude a peace treaty with Egypt (in 1979) and accept a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO (in 1993).
After World War II, it became clear that the old tactics used by countries around the world since the beginning of the 20th century were completely unsuitable for use in modern wars. The rapid development of aviation and armored vehicles, as well as the principles of their interaction, verified and tested during the largest conflict of the 20th century, formed a new doctrine. This doctrine was most successfully used by Israel in the so-called Six-Day War of 1967.
The history of modern Arab-Israeli relations dates back to 1948, when the State of Israel was formed. The formation of this state caused great discontent among the Arab population of Palestine, as well as Syria and Egypt, who had views of these lands and wanted to have their allies on them. It was for this purpose that Israel’s Arab neighbors began military operations with the aim of seizing territory (the fighting itself began back in 1947; in 1948 they took the form of a war against the Jewish state). However, Israel's victory in the war did not allow the Arabs to “solve the Jewish question” even then.
The Suez crisis and the brief war significantly increased the hostility between Israel and Egypt, which were opposing sides in this conflict. Another important consequence was the distancing of Egypt from Western countries and rapprochement with the USSR, which provided the country with significant economic assistance. At the same time, Egypt was moving closer to Syria, as well as to a number of other Arab states. In November 1966, Egypt and Syria signed a treaty establishing a military alliance between the two countries.
During the first half of the 1960s, Egypt's relations with Israel stabilized somewhat, and soon tensions between the countries practically ceased.
However, relations between Israel and Syria rapidly deteriorated. There were several reasons for the conflict. The first and perhaps most important was the problem of water resources. After the armistice was signed in 1949, the mouth of the Jordan River became part of the demilitarized zone between the two countries. This river fed Lake Kinneret, which was partially located on the territory of Israel and had a serious impact on the economic life of the state. Syria's work to change the course of the Jordan River to divert its water from the lake sparked a violent border conflict that ended in Israeli victory. The second reason was the desire of both countries to gain full control over the demilitarized zone, which also often spilled over into border incidents. The third reason was that Syria provided support to Arab partisan formations in Israel, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Armed clashes on the Syrian-Israeli border in early 1967 became more frequent, sometimes escalating into full-fledged hostilities using tanks, aircraft and artillery.
In May 1967, Egypt warned the USSR that Israel was preparing a war against Syria, for which it concentrated 10 to 13 brigades on the Syrian border. In this regard, the Egyptian leadership was forced to begin mobilizing and concentrating troops in Sinai, on the Israeli border. These measures were meant to have a deterrent effect on Israel.
In response to mobilization in Egypt and Syria, mobilization began in Israel. Following this, Jordan began mobilization, which was also not distinguished by its sympathies for Israel. Algeria also joined the coalition against Israel, sending its troops to Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula, Sudan and Iraq, which sent troops to Jordan. Thus, the general picture of the upcoming conflict has practically formed. Israel had to fight essentially against hostile states that surrounded it.
At the same time, at the insistence of the Egyptian leadership, UN peacekeeping troops were withdrawn from the Sinai zone, and by the beginning of June, the Israeli border was almost everywhere uncovered. Now conflict was almost inevitable.
By the morning of June 5, 1967, it became clear to the Israeli leadership that war would begin in the coming days, if not hours. This was confirmed by the beginning of attacks by Egyptian troops on the Sinai front. If the troops of Arab countries launched a simultaneous attack on Israel from all sides, the consequences for it would be the most disastrous due to the absolute impossibility of repelling the invasion on all fronts at the same time.
In order to get ahead of the enemy and deliver a preemptive strike to him, as well as neutralize his aircraft if possible, the Israeli Air Force, with the approval of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan (one of the authors of the Israeli doctrine of the “modern blitzkrieg”), carried out Operation Moked. This operation was directed against the Egyptian Air Force. The first wave of Mirage attack aircraft left for the mission at 7 a.m. Israeli time. Already at 7:45, they suddenly attacked a number of Egyptian airfields, using special concrete-piercing bombs to disable their runways. After this, powerful air strikes were carried out directly on Egyptian aviation, as a result of which by the end of June 5, Egypt's losses in aviation amounted to about 420 aircraft, and Israel's - only 20.
At approximately 11 a.m., Israeli airfields and military installations began to come under air raids from Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi aircraft. However, on the same day, strikes were also carried out on their airfields, and aviation losses were also significantly higher than Israeli ones. Thus, already on the first day, Israel essentially seized air superiority, which was an important component of the new military doctrine. Already from June 5, the countries of the anti-Israeli coalition had practically no opportunity to attack Israel, since the lack of reliable air cover completely excluded this.
However, fighting began on the Sinai front on June 5 between Egyptian and Israeli troops. Here, on the Israeli side, 14 brigades were concentrated, which during the first half of the day successfully restrained Egyptian pressure. Then the Israeli offensive began in Gaza, as well as westward through the Sinai Peninsula. Here it was planned to make a lightning-fast push to reach the Suez Canal along the shortest route and cut off the parts located in the south of the peninsula from the rest of Egypt.
At the same time, fighting broke out in Jerusalem itself. Here the Arab legion entered the battle, using mortars to fire at the western, Israeli, part of the city. In this regard, three brigades were sent to the Israeli garrison of Jerusalem, which quickly turned the situation in their favor. By the end of June 5, Israeli paratroopers managed to make their way to the Old City, knocking out the Arabs from their territory.
On the Syrian front, in the Golan Heights region, no major changes occurred. On the first day of fighting, the sides exchanged only artillery strikes.
By 12 o'clock on June 6, 1967, on the Sinai front, Israeli troops managed to completely capture Gaza and allocate additional troops to rush to Suez. At this time, battles were already taking place for Rafah and El-Arish, which were taken by the end of the day. Also in the center of Sinai during the day of June 6, the 2nd Motorized Infantry Division of the Egyptians was surrounded and defeated. As a result, a gap was created here, into which Israeli tank units rushed, soon encountering resistance from the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division of Egypt.
At the same time, part of the Israeli tank forces operating on the Sinai front turned to the southwest in order to cut off the Egyptian forces operating in the south of the peninsula and, due to the rapid advance of the Israelis, began to retreat to the west. The advancing Israeli troops were supported by aviation, carrying out airstrikes on the retreating and therefore most vulnerable Egyptian troops. Thus, on June 6, Israel's victory in the Sinai Peninsula became apparent.
On the Jordanian front, the events of June 6 were marked by the complete encirclement of the Old City in Jerusalem. Here Israeli tank units occupied Ramallah in the north and Latrun in the south. However, the Old City itself could not be taken by storm on June 6: Arab troops put up fierce resistance, inflicting serious losses on Israeli units.
On the Syrian front, June 6, like the previous day, was not marked by serious changes in the situation. Artillery exchanges continued until the morning of June 9, with neither side attempting to seize the initiative.
Also on June 6, the only naval battle of the Six Day War took place. The Israeli Navy, which has stepped up offensive patrols in the Suez Canal area, discovered an Egyptian missile boat near Port Said. As a result, the boat was sunk by the Israeli destroyer Yafo.
On June 7, on the Sinai front, Israeli forces occupied the settlements of Bir Gifgafa and Rumani with virtually no resistance from Egyptian troops. Only in the central part of the front did one of the Israeli tank brigades stop due to lack of fuel and was subsequently surrounded by superior Egyptian forces. However, Egyptian troops failed to destroy this brigade due to the need to withdraw troops to the Suez Canal and the rapid advance of Israeli units.
In the area of Sharm el-Sheikh, in order to quickly capture the city, an Israeli airborne force was landed, which advanced to the northwest along the shore of the Gulf of Suez to join the mobile Israeli formations that completed cutting off Egyptian troops in the southeast of the peninsula.
On the Jordanian front, a tense assault resulted in the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem by Israeli forces. On the same day, the cities of Bethlehem and Gush Etzion were also taken. By this time, almost the entire territory of Palestine was already under the control of Israeli troops. After this, the defeat of anti-Israeli forces on this front became predetermined. However, the Israeli troops also suffered serious losses, which is why they were absolutely not interested in continuing the bloodshed. As a result, already at 20:00 on June 7, both sides accepted the UN Security Council proposal for a ceasefire.
On June 8, 1967, Israeli troops on the Sinai front continued to advance deeper into Egyptian territory. In the north they managed to reach the Suez Canal, after which they stopped. In the central sector of the front, Israeli troops managed to push back the Egyptian units and relieve the tank brigade that was surrounded on June 7. In the south, Israeli airborne forces linked up with mobile units that had passed through the entire Sinai and continued north to the Suez Canal. By the end of June 8, almost the entire Sinai Peninsula was in the hands of the Israeli armed forces, and its tank and motorized units reached the Suez Canal along almost its entire length.
From the first day of the Arab-Israeli war, the UN Security Council began its work. The goal was to immediately stop the bloodshed in the Middle East and return the parties to the negotiating table. However, in the early days, when the mood of victory in the Arab countries was quite high, it was almost impossible to do this. Additional inconvenience was caused by the fact that from the first days the parties were tightly drawn into battles, the goal of which was to inflict maximum damage on the enemy.
However, the first fruits of efforts to stabilize the situation appeared on the third day of fighting, June 7. On this day, a truce was concluded on the Jordanian front, where fighting between Israeli troops and the armed forces of Jordan, Iraq and the Arab Legion ceased.
On June 9, 1967, the UN Security Council's ceasefire proposal was accepted by Israeli forces on the Sinai front. By this time, Israel had achieved complete military victory here, with no intention of moving further west. Egyptian troops ceased fire only the next day, June 10.
On the Syrian front in the Golan Heights region, on June 9, early in the morning, Israeli troops unexpectedly went on the offensive for the enemy. Moreover, if during the day the Syrian troops managed to restrain the Israelis, then by night the pressure intensified, and the Syrian defense was broken through. At the same time, other parts of Israel fought their way north of Lake Kinneret, outflanking the Syrian forces fighting in the Golan Heights. As a result, by June 10, Syrian troops here were pushed out to the northeast and the large city of Quneitra was taken. At 19:30 pm, a ceasefire agreement also came into force on the Syrian front.
Thus, after a truce was concluded on all fronts, the war of the Arab states against Israel essentially came to an end.
According to generalized data, the losses of the Arab states during the Six-Day War amounted to 13 to 18 thousand people killed, about 25 thousand wounded and about 8 thousand people captured, 900 armored vehicles and about 500 aircraft. Of these losses, Egypt accounts for the bulk - 12 thousand dead, 20 thousand wounded and 6 thousand prisoners. Iraq suffered the least losses - approximately 10 people were killed and 30 wounded.
Israeli losses are significantly lower than those of the Arab coalition and range from 800 to 1 thousand people, 394 armored vehicles and 47 aircraft.
As a result of the conflict, Israel inflicted a crushing defeat on the countries of the Arab coalition in six days. The air forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria were almost destroyed, as a result of which these countries had to spend enormous amounts of money on their reconstruction. Also, huge losses of military equipment generally led to the loss of combat effectiveness by the armies of the Arab states.
The Soviet leadership finally became convinced that the USSR had no powerful allies in the Middle East. The huge funds allocated by the Soviet Union for arming the Arab countries, training their military personnel and providing economic assistance essentially did not bear fruit. In the context of these events, the reorientation of the new Egyptian President Anwar Sadat towards the United States in 1970 looked very sad.
At the same time, Israel has not managed to solve all of its foreign policy problems. In August 1967, a conference of Arab leaders was held in the capital of Sudan, Khartoum. At this meeting, the principle of a triple “no” was adopted: “no” to peace with Israel, “no” to negotiations with Israel, “no” to recognition of Israel. A new stage of arming the Arab states neighboring Israel has begun. Thus, Israel's military victory did not at all exclude military conflicts with Arab states in the future, as was proven already in 1968, when Egypt began military operations against Israel in order to recapture the occupied territories and gain revenge for a humiliating defeat. However, after the Six-Day War, Israel did not stop preparing for new military clashes.
Like any conflict, the Six Day War was accompanied by a major humanitarian disaster. Tens of thousands of Arabs were forced to flee Palestine and the Old City of Jerusalem to neighboring countries to escape persecution by Jews.
The Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 was essentially a triumph of military doctrine, called a “modern blitzkrieg” by a number of military analysts. A sudden air raid on enemy airfields, the neutralization of enemy air forces, close cooperation between tank units and aviation, landings behind enemy lines - all this has already been shown to the world, but with the use of modern weapons - for the first time. Until now, all over the world, the history of the Six-Day War is studied as one of the most brilliant in its design and execution of operations to seize the initiative and inflict defeat against several opponents, whose forces in total exceeded their own.
Despite the fact that this year marks the 50th anniversary of the Six-Day War, this conflict will long be remembered not only in Israel, but also in the Arab countries that took part in it.
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Why the Israeli army managed to win the Six Day War
The “Six Day War” (June 5–10, 1967) in the Middle East has largely become a household name. This term in a broad sense began to mean a crushing, quick defeat of a formally more powerful enemy. In a narrow sense, the successful implementation of the tactics of the first disarming strike on enemy airfields, providing the attacking side with air superiority leading to victory on the ground.
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan at the beginning of the war had a total of up to 700 combat aircraft, Israel - about 300. On the first day of the war, the Arabs lost at airfields and in air battles, according to various sources, from 360 to 420 aircraft, Israel (in air battles and from ground air defense) - from 18 to 44 aircraft. The difference, of course, is colossal, but still the Arab Air Forces did not cease to exist (at least the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian ones were completely destroyed). Even if we take the worst loss values for them, by the morning of the second day of the war, the sides had approximately quantitative equality in aviation. However, although isolated air battles took place before 9 June, the Israelis gained complete air supremacy. This was explained by the much better flight and combat training of Israeli pilots, a more advanced aviation control system, as well as the severe psychological shock of the Arabs from the defeat of June 5.
Air superiority, of course, greatly contributed to the Israeli victory on the ground, although it was not an easy ride. During the first two days of the war, the Egyptian 6th Motorized Infantry Division even managed to penetrate 10 km into Israeli territory. Nevertheless, air supremacy, a higher level of combat training and initiative of the Israeli armed forces compared to the Arab ones did their job. In addition, the Egyptian leadership fell into panic. On the morning of June 6, the commander-in-chief, General Amer, gave his troops in Sinai the order to retreat. Naturally, this retreat, in the face of continuous Israeli attacks from land and air, very quickly turned into a flight and a complete disaster. The fighting in Sinai ended on the morning of June 9, the Egyptians lost from 10 to 15 thousand people. killed and up to 5 thousand prisoners, up to 800 tanks (291 T-54, 82 T-55, 251 T-34/85, 72 IS-3M, 29 PT-76, up to 50 Shermans), a huge number of other armored vehicles. Moreover, the Israelis captured a significant part of the Egyptian tanks and armored personnel carriers in perfect working order. There were so many trophies that, despite the lack of Soviet spare parts, the practical Israelis accepted them into service (including 81 T-54 and 49 T-55), replacing the weapons and engines with Western ones. Some examples of that equipment still serve Israel today. In particular, the very successful Akhzarit armored personnel carrier was created on the T-54/T-55 chassis, which was actively used in the 2006 Lebanese war. Israel itself lost 120 tanks in Sinai - less than it captured.
In parallel, there were battles between Israel and Jordan for Jerusalem and the West Bank, and these battles were distinguished by exceptional tenacity. So, on June 6, the Jordanians even surrounded an Israeli tank battalion, but failed to destroy it. Once again the superior level of Israeli training and initiative and air supremacy prevailed. In addition, the Jordanian Armed Forces were the smallest of all the Arab armies involved in this war, making them the most difficult to resist the Jews. The sides' losses in armored vehicles turned out to be quite close (about 200 tanks for Jordan, a little over 100 for Israel). Here the fighting ended on June 7, the Arabs were driven back beyond the Jordan. The Jews took revenge for the defeats of 1948 by recapturing Latrun and the Old City of Jerusalem.
Syria “philosophically,” that is, without doing anything, watched as Israel crushed its allies, and, of course, waited for its time, which came on June 9. At noon, Israeli troops began their assault on the Golan Heights. For them, this part of the war was the most difficult, since the terrain was on the side of the Arabs. Even according to their own data, the Israelis lost twice as many tanks here as the Syrians - 160 versus 80 (interestingly, the Syrian army had both T-34/85 and German StuG III). However, the Jews stormed the heights, already knowing that they would win; the Syrians defended themselves, already knowing that they would lose. At 18.30 on June 10, an official ceasefire took place.
The Arabs lost at least 1,100 tanks, from 380 to 450 combat aircraft (including up to 60 in air battles), and up to 40 thousand people killed and captured. Israeli losses amounted to about 400 tanks (Centurion, Sherman and M48), 45 aircraft (12 of them in air battles), up to 1 thousand people killed.
Sherman tank on the road between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, 1967. Photo: AFP/East News
In 6 days, Israel managed to radically change the balance of power in the Middle East. He defeated the armies of all three Arab countries bordering him (the fourth, Lebanon, was not taken into account due to its weakness); his main enemy, Egypt, suffered especially heavy losses. Even more important was the fact that Israel's geographical position was now very favorable. As of the morning of June 5, the Arabs had the theoretical ability to cut it in half in less than an hour (at its narrowest point, from the border with Jordan to the Mediterranean coast there was only 15 km of Israeli territory). On the evening of June 10, the Jewish state was reliably protected from the north by the Golan Heights, from the east by the Jordan River, from the southwest by the Suez Canal, as well as by the Sinai Peninsula and the Negev Desert. The Israeli leadership was confident that it had ensured the security of its country for at least 20–25 years. In 1970, the geopolitical situation became even more favorable for him after Jordan de facto withdrew from the anti-Israeli front due to the conflict with the Palestinians and Syria behind them.
The Six-Day War was a triumph for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF in its Hebrew acronym). To this day, the IDF remains the best living refutation of the Anglo-Saxon thesis (which was very fond of many Russians) about the advantages of a “professional”, that is, a mercenary army. The Israeli army is, one might say, the most conscript army in the world; even women are drafted into it; no alternative service is provided for (it is “carried out” in prison). At the same time, it is distinguished by the highest level of combat training, excellent living conditions for military personnel, and the absence of hazing. The well-known explanation for this phenomenon, which is that “Israel is surrounded by enemies,” is completely meaningless. The fact of being surrounded by enemies, of course, requires the presence of a conscript army (in general, the principle of manning the armed forces of any country is determined by what tasks they face, and nothing more), but it has nothing to do with the internal structure of the army and the quality of training of personnel.
From a political point of view, Israel's behavior in June '67 was certainly aggression. At the same time, it should be noted that before the start of the war, anti-Israeli rhetoric in Arab countries entered the stage of outright hysteria and Tel Aviv could interpret it as preparation for aggression against it. Given the Arabs' significant military and geographic advantage, it would put Israel in an extremely difficult situation, so he decided to launch a preemptive strike and remind that winners are not judged. Of course, hysterical rhetoric is very often intended only for internal consumption. However, the external objects of hysterical rhetoric are not at all obliged to understand that this is all “make-believe.” The Arabs simply “responsible for the bazaar,” which was fair. If you can’t fight, sit and be silent.
As the past four decades have shown, the Six-Day War was the high point of Israeli success. After that, the retreats began. Moreover, their inevitability was laid down by this war itself. The Arabs, having lost territory, received a legal justification for their anti-Semitism. The Israelis, having captured the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip, received an absolutely hostile Palestinian population inside the country, which, as it now turns out, thanks to the incomparably higher birth rate, can very soon surpass the Jewish population in numbers. As a result, the immediate improvement in the strategic position became a powerful time bomb under the Jewish state.
The Arab armies have long ceased to risk getting involved in battle with the IDF. But with the “basic instinct” the Arabs are fine. Demographics today turn out to be much stronger than traditional ones. Militarily null Palestine is gradually achieving what heavily armed Egypt and Syria failed to do.
- a six-day war launched by Israel in June against Egypt, Jordan and Syria in order to seize part of their territory and implement its expansionist plans in the Middle East.
The situation in the Middle East began to rapidly heat up in the spring of 1967. Egypt, Syria and Jordan massed their troops to Israel's borders, expelled UN peacekeepers and blocked the entry of Israeli ships into the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
Arab states took active measures to increase the combat readiness of their armed forces and their deployment. On May 14, 1967, Cairo began bringing its army to full combat readiness. Troops were deployed in and around the Suez Canal Zone, and on May 15, Egyptian forces were transferred to the Sinai and began to concentrate near the Israeli border. On May 21, general mobilization was announced in Egypt. By May 18, Syrian troops were deployed in the Golan Heights.
Jordan began mobilization on May 17 and completed it on May 24. On May 30, a mutual defense agreement was concluded between Cairo and Amman. On May 29, Algerian troops were sent to Egypt, and on May 31, Iraqi troops were sent to Jordan.
On May 9, 1967, the Israeli parliament gave the government the authority to conduct a military operation against Syria. At that time, relations between the two countries were strained due to a conflict over water resources (the Jordan drainage problem), control over demilitarized zones along the 1948 ceasefire line; due to Damascus' support for Palestinian Arab paramilitary groups who committed sabotage against Israel. In the second half of May, the mobilization of reservists began in Israel. On May 20, Israel completed partial mobilization (according to other sources, complete). On May 23, 1967, the Israeli government declared that obstructing Israeli shipping would be considered a declaration of war, as would the withdrawal of UN security troops, the sending of Iraqi forces to Egypt, and the signing of a military alliance between Amman and Cairo. Israel reserved the right to initiate military action first. On the same day, the Israeli government instructed the General Staff to complete preparations for war against Syria and Egypt and begin general mobilization in the country.
In quantitative terms, in general and in the main operational directions, the troops of the Arab Union significantly exceeded the Israeli forces, but in terms of the general level of combat training, the Israeli armed forces were seriously superior to the forces of the Arab states.
The military personnel of Egypt, Jordan and Syria totaled 435 thousand people (60 brigades), with Iraqi forces - up to 547 thousand, and Israel - 250 thousand (31 brigades).
The number of tanks for the Arabs is 1,950 (with Iraq - 2.5 thousand), for Israel - 1,120 (according to other sources, 800); the number of aircraft for the Arabs is 415 (with Iraqi 957), for the Israelis up to 300.
In the Sinai direction, Egypt had: 90 thousand people (20 brigades), 900 tanks and self-propelled guns (self-propelled artillery), 284 combat aircraft. Israel: 70 thousand soldiers (14 brigades), 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 200 aircraft. In the Damascus direction near Syria: 53 thousand people (12 brigades), 340 tanks and self-propelled guns, 106 aircraft. Israel: 50 thousand soldiers (10 brigades), 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 70 aircraft. In the Amman direction near Jordan: 55 thousand soldiers (12 brigades), 290 tanks and self-propelled guns, 25 aircraft. Israel: 35 thousand people (7 brigades), 220 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 30 aircraft.
The Arabs planned to launch the offensive first, but due to some disagreements among the leadership, the dates had to be postponed to a later time.
The offensive groups moved to the defense of the occupied areas, hastily erecting engineering structures from rather meager means at hand. Israel immediately took advantage of this. His command, fearing coordinated offensive actions by superior enemy forces from three directions, decided to defeat the armies of the triple coalition one by one before they finally agreed on a plan for joint operations.
At dawn on June 5, 1967, Israeli aircraft attacked airfields and air bases in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and disabled up to 66% of the aircraft of these countries.
Following this, delivering the main blow on the Egyptian front, the ground forces went on the offensive. Having broken the resistance of the 7th and 2nd motorized infantry divisions of Egypt, by the morning of June 6 they advanced 40-70 km deep into the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptian command tried to stop the enemy's advance with counterattacks, but these attempts were thwarted by Israeli aircraft. On June 8, Israeli advanced units reached the Suez Canal. The Israeli offensive on the Jordanian front began on the evening of June 5. They managed to encircle the main group of the Jordanian army and defeat it. On June 6 and 7, the Israeli airborne brigade captured the eastern sector of Jerusalem. On June 9, Israel launched military operations against Syria. By the end of June 10, Israeli troops had penetrated up to 26 km into Syrian territory. At the request of the UN Security Council and under diplomatic pressure from the USSR and other countries, Israel ceased hostilities on June 10.
In six days of military operations, Israel achieved its goals, capturing the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the western provinces of Jordan and the Golan Heights (about 70 thousand square kilometers of Arab countries with a population of over one million people). Arab losses, according to the British Institute for Strategic Studies, amounted to: 40 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, about 900 tanks, more than 1000 artillery pieces, more than 400 combat aircraft.
Israeli losses during the war were: about 800 people killed, 700 people wounded, about 100 tanks and 48 combat aircraft.
The defeat of the Arabs was due to the unpreparedness of their armed forces to repel aggression and scattered actions, which allowed Israel to defeat them one by one.
The offensive of the Israeli troops was distinguished by decisiveness of objectives, swiftness, skillful use of terrain, widespread use of various forms of maneuver, and the conduct of combat operations both day and night. The breakthrough of the defense was carried out by delivering several strikes in order to fragment it, encircle and destroy enemy troops in parts.
On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 242 on the political settlement of the Middle East conflict, which provided for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories and ensuring the territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the region. However, Israel has not fully complied with this resolution.
The ownership of the occupied West Bank and annexed East Jerusalem with the historical center of the city and the shrines of three monotheistic religions remains the subject of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is not the first generation of world leaders trying to resolve.
From the Gaza Strip, but maintain a blockade of the enclave, where two million Palestinians live under Hamas rule. Attempts to resolve the status of the Golan Heights, also annexed by Israel, came to naught with the outbreak of the civil war in Syria. The Sinai Peninsula, the largest territorial prize of the Six-Day War, was returned to Egypt under the terms of a bilateral peace treaty.
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Forty years ago, a war began in the Middle East that lasted only one week: the young state of Israel had to fight in three theaters of military operations at once. How did he manage to win this confrontation?
At 8:15 a.m. on June 5, 1967, the operator of the Jordanian radar station in Ajlun saw a scattering of flashing dots on the screen. He hesitated for a second. And then he conveyed to headquarters just one word: “grapes.” This conventional signal meant “war”.
Several hundred kilometers from Ajlun, at Air Force headquarters in Tel Aviv, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Chief of the General Staff Yitzhak Rabin and Air Force commander Moti Hod waited tensely for messages from their pilots. Operation Focus, on the success of which the fate of the country depended, began.Airplanes with Stars of David on their fuselages, rushing over the ground at low level, gained altitude. And at Egyptian airfields, just at that hour, the MiGs that had completed their morning patrol were wearily taxiing into the parking lot. There were only a few training machines in the skies over Sinai and the Nile
Egyptian intelligence, meanwhile, had information that war would begin in early June, but the commander of the ground forces, Field Marshal Amer, was somehow incomprehensibly unaware of this information. And Defense Minister Badran, having learned about the receipt of an urgent radiogram from Jordan, went to bed and ordered him not to be disturbed! The Lightning lay unread on his desk at 8:30 a.m. the next morning, when the first Israeli planes struck their intended targets.
But for the intelligence services of the Jewish state it was a triumph: by the time hostilities began, they knew not only the parking lot of every Egyptian aircraft, but also the names and ranks of all the pilots. At 10.35 General Hod reported to Rabin: “Enemy aviation has ceased to exist.” Within an hour and a half, more than 300 of Egypt's 420 combat vehicles were destroyed, while the attackers lost only nine. Immediately after this defeat, the divisions of generals Tal, Joffe and Sharon crossed the border into Sinai
In the decade separating the First Sinai Campaign from the Six Day War, 1956-1967, the State of Israel flourished in the full sense of the word. UN troops for the time being maintained calm on its “problematic” southwestern borders, and the lifting of the blockade of the Straits of Tiran provided the country with access to the markets of Africa and Southeast Asia. The economy grew at a record pace, life became “better and more fun” for thousands of immigrants, and new universities and research centers opened. Close scientific and military cooperation with France allowed Israel to develop its own nuclear program, which the government tried, not very successfully, to keep secret from everyone, including its own citizens. In 1963, after a series of political scandals, the founding father of the state, David Ben-Gurion, was forced to resign as prime minister. His place was taken by a certain Levi Eshkol (born Lev Shkolnik from the village of Uratovo, Kyiv province) - a talented financier and bureaucrat, but completely devoid of charisma: his timidity in public immediately became a proverb. But it was this quiet, modest and prone to compromise man who was to lead Israel during the critical days of 1967.
At the origins
The Zionist movement arose in Europe at the end of the 19th century for the “final solution of the Jewish question” - not in Hitler’s way, of course, but in fulfillment of the aspirations of the people themselves. “The time has come to return to Palestine and create our own state there. The time has come to end the exile and become, like other peoples, farmers, workers, soldiers,” the Zionists called. Not all Jews supported these slogans: the Orthodox considered the creation of a Jewish state before the coming of the Messiah to be blasphemy (this opinion still exists!); communists fought for the victory of the proletariat, rejecting nationalism; seekers of a better life emigrated to America. But there were also dreamers who believed in the Big Idea. Thousands of people from Russia, Poland, Romania went to Palestine. And in 1917, the British, having won it from the Turks, promised to hand it over to the Jews, but the local Arabs were not attracted to the idea of creating such a state. The matter remained in limbo, and in 1936 a bloody uprising broke out against Jewish settlers and the British administration. At the cost of enormous efforts, the latter managed to break the resistance of the rebels. At the same time, a proposal arose for the first time to divide Palestine into two parts - Israeli and Arab. The Muslims angrily rejected this plan, and London, fearing that they might support Hitler in the upcoming war, tried to appease them at the expense of the Jews: repatriation was stopped.
When World War II ended, Britain initially again banned entry into their historical homeland for survivors of Nazi camps who dreamed of leaving the “huge cemetery” of Europe as soon as possible. And now the Zionists have risen in revolt. The old empire, drained of blood by the war, was bursting at the seams: India and Pakistan gained independence, the Asian and African colonies were constantly “worried,” and the demands of the Jews were supported by the USSR, the USA and the world community. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted for the division of Palestine. The Jews again agreed, the Arabs again refused. War broke out again in Palestine. Moreover, in May 1948, the desperate British abandoned it, and the formation of the State of Israel was immediately proclaimed in the territories controlled by Jews. On the same day, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq declared war on him. Then the young country survived largely thanks to the USSR: with Stalin’s consent, Czechoslovakia provided it with a large batch of weapons, which made it possible to hold back the first Arab onslaught. Golda Meir went on an official visit to Moscow. But, alas, the Soviet-Israeli friendship did not last long: the government in Tel Aviv did not hide its pro-American sympathies from the very beginning.
In Syria, in the same 1963, the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Ba'ath), well remembered from the Hussein era in Iraq, came to power. Its local leaders, dominated by young officers and secular intellectuals, were eager to lead the country into a Soviet-style “bright future.” Accordingly, they turned to the Soviet Union for help. Syria instantly became the main Soviet ally in the Middle East. Official Moscow supplied Damascus with weapons, and numerous specialists and advisers sent by it trained the army and helped modernize the economy. For Brezhnev and his comrades, the Syrian “bridgehead” for penetration into the Middle East, where Washington had many more allies, seemed extremely important. After all, even Egypt, which worked closely with the USSR, in general, did not always focus on the Kremlin: Nasser actually outlawed the Communist Party! So we had to seize the moment - the Baath Party and its reforms did not enjoy broad popular support. And so, it was decided to resort to the good old method, which always and everywhere works flawlessly on the Arab population, to reduce the matter to confrontation with Israel. Soon, the so-called ceasefire line between the two countries - a legacy of the 1948 war - became full of continuous skirmishes and artillery duels. The batteries located on the Golan Plateau fired at the Jewish settlements located below, at its foot. And the Palestinian Arabs, incited by the Syrians, raided kibbutzim, mined roads, took hostages, and destroyed crops.
There was, by the way, another very significant and this time real, practical reason for the territorial dispute. Namely, water, which in the Middle East, as is known, is “more expensive than gold.” The Arabs prevented Israel from building a canal from Lake Tiberias to the Negev Desert and tried to change the course of the Jordan, Israel's main source of drinking water, “in their favor.” The young state did not remain in debt, sending punitive raids tens of kilometers deep into Syria and Jordan.
In May 1967, literally a couple of weeks before the start of the war, an Egyptian delegation led by Parliament Chairman Anwar Sadat arrived in Moscow. The Soviet side “in passing” conveyed to the Egyptians information about the concentration of large Israeli forces on the Syrian border. Egypt and Syria concluded a defensive treaty, and in the event of an attack on one of the countries, the second pledged to come to the rescue.
In fact, no concentration of forces occurred at all; the Chief of the Egyptian General Staff, General Fauzi, who was urgently sent to Damascus, could verify this personally. UN observers also stated the same. Levi Eshkol even invited Soviet Ambassador Dmitry Chuvakin to go to the north of the country himself and make sure that nothing special was happening there. Dude refused.
What made Soviet intelligence misinform the Egyptians is still unclear. Special concern for the security of Syria? The desire to shift responsibility for the shaky Damascus regime onto someone else's shoulders?.. Be that as it may, despite objective denials, Nasser just believed the false warning and decided to act. The President had no doubt: by bringing his troops to the border in Sinai “in response” to the Israeli demarche in the north, he would make an impression on Israel. Should he, the “victor of Britain and France,” cowardly hide behind the blue berets of the UN?
From the Suez crisis to the Six Day War
The defeat in the 1948 war shocked the Arabs. Many of them who remained under Israeli rule partially fled, others were expelled. This is how Palestinian refugees appeared. An Arab state was not created in Palestine; Jordan annexed Judea and Samaria, and Gaza went to Egypt. In many Muslim countries, primarily in Egypt and Syria, radical youth considered corruption and the ineffectiveness of the regimes operating in their countries to be the main reason for their defeat. In 1952, army officers overthrew the king in Cairo, and two years later power passed to the young Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, who decided to reform the backward and unstable economy of the Land of the Pyramids. In foreign policy, Nasser closely cooperated with the Soviet Union, without severing relations with the United States. However, Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, open support for anti-French rebels in Algeria, assistance to the Palestinians in their raids against Israel and the blockade of the Strait of Tiran - the only Israeli outlet to the Red Sea - led to the creation of an anti-Egyptian coalition, which in 1956 carried out Operation Musketeer. Nasser was saved only by the simultaneous and rather brutal pressure of the USSR and the USA on Britain, France and Israel. However, Egypt skillfully turned its painful military defeat into a political victory, and Britain and France ceased to play major roles in the Middle East, losing primacy to the new superpowers. The Jews had to leave the captured Gaza and Sinai, but Egypt also made concessions - UN troops took the place of the Israelis, and the blockade of Elat was lifted. Despite this “step back,” in the eyes of all the Arabs of the world, Nasser became the conquering hero of two European predators and their Zionist henchmen: using the personal popularity of his president and Soviet military-political assistance, Egypt confidently turned into the leader of the Arab world. In North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen, young officers and intellectuals looked to the brave colonel as a guiding light and role model. Pro-Nasser officers in Yemen even overthrew the local ruler and proclaimed a republic. As a result, a bloody and protracted civil war began, into which Egypt was soon drawn. The best parts of his army were stuck in the sands of Yemen for many years, fighting monarchists backed by Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the country's economy, despite the help of the USSR, was teetering on the brink of collapse, but this, however, did not prevent Nasser from spending huge amounts of money on a distant war and conspiracies against the “reactionary royal regimes.” The Arab Cold War lasted for years, punctuated by short-lived alliances and vows of eternal friendship. Without exception, all the rulers of the Middle East had only one thing in common: hatred of Israel.
On May 15, Cairo declared a state of emergency. Two tank divisions, thundering along the capital's boulevards, drove towards the Israeli border.
The next day, Nasser demanded that the commander of the UN forces in Sinai, Indian General Rihier, abandon some positions. He, fearing that the Egyptian demarche would provoke a war, refused to do this without an order from U Thant, the UN Secretary General, who, in turn, said: we cannot take half measures - either all the peacekeepers will remain in their positions, or they will not will leave Sinai.
After consulting, Nasser and Field Marshal Amer decided to accept the challenge: let them get the hell out! And U Thant agreed surprisingly easily; it was expected that he would at least try to gain time. There was no room left for maneuver: the blue helmets left, the Egyptian soldiers, jubilant, took their positions.
Thus, without firing a single shot, Nasser achieved another political victory - something he had become quite accustomed to over the previous 10 years. The Sinai Peninsula and the Straits of Tiran were again under complete Egyptian control. And from here comes a clear conclusion, soon voiced by Field Marshal Amer: “How can my soldiers in Sharm el-Sheikh, seeing an Israeli ship, let it sail by calmly? This is absolutely impossible! And if Israel starts a war, then so much the worse for it - our army will easily defeat any enemy!” On May 22, the blockade of the Strait of Tiran was declared again, and Israel’s only exit to the Red Sea was slammed shut again.
The Israelis' silence was seen by the Arabs as a sign of weakness. Confidence in an easy victory inspired the Arab world: “If the Jews want war, we say to them: “Welcome!” Let them come and see how strong Egypt is!” Nasser declared in front of a crowd of thousands. “Having won, we will help the surviving Jews return back to Europe. However, I doubt that anyone will survive,” the chairman of the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Ahmed Shukeyri, promised at another rally.
Two steps away from deathBy the end of May, the noose around Israel's neck was completely tightened. One of Nasser's worst enemies, King Hussein of Jordan, secretly arrived in Cairo and signed a mutual military assistance treaty with him, thereby joining the Egyptian-Syrian alliance. General Riad, a talented and experienced officer from the banks of the Nile, went to Amman, where he took command of the Jordanian Arab Legion. The small Jewish state was surrounded on all sides, and it seemed that nothing, except perhaps the direct military intervention of the United States, would save it. However, the Arabs, who were anticipating triumph, were not verbally afraid even of the Americans. Amer self-confidently declared: his army, they say, could cope with the Sixth Mediterranean Fleet in no time, and the Soviet Union would definitely come to the rescue if necessary. By the way, the Egyptians and Syrians had no doubt about the USSR’s readiness for intervention, having misinterpreted the general bellicose statements of Podgorny, Kosygin and Grechko. The words of experienced diplomats that the Russians would not fight so far from their borders were drowned in the marches of “near victory.”
In Israel, meanwhile, preparations for the final and decisive battle were in full swing, although Eshkol, for his part, tried with all his might to avoid bloodshed, resolutely rejecting Rabin’s idea of a preemptive strike. The Chief of the General Staff constantly tried to impose it on the head of state, but in response he heard “no,” and from the lips of his most influential foreign ally, Charles de Gaulle, even: “Israel should under no circumstances shoot first!” US President Lyndon Johnson echoed him: “You will not be alone unless you decide not to act alone.” However, he could not offer any real help at that time; the Americans, stuck in Vietnam, were by no means eager to get involved in another local war with a dubious outcome. Congress would never have authorized this “event.”
Eshkol announced the partial mobilization of reservists on May 19, immediately after the withdrawal of UN troops from Sinai. Army command Rabin and the chief of the operations department of the General Staff, Ezer Weizman, had no doubt in their hearts about victory and rushed into battle with the same fervor as their enemies (another matter is that they were forbidden to show it publicly). Weizmann, the nephew of Israel's first president and a future president himself, served through World War II as a combat pilot in the Royal Air Force and devoted his life to transforming Israeli aviation into a powerful, coherent machine. He knew firsthand how things were: “During the war, we often said: “The Germans have surrounded us again, poor fellows.” Now the same can be said about the Arabs.” But the authorities, as already noted, were in no hurry to act. Rabin suffered a nervous breakdown, the prime minister was close to a heart attack, and the nation felt such uncertainty among its leaders and demanded change: on June 1, under pressure from various sides, a government of national unity was formed, joined by opposition parties: GAHAL under the leadership of Menachem Begin and a small but the influential “RAFI”, created by Ben-Gurion. Its representative, the famous one-eyed General Moshe Dayan, former Chief of the General Staff and Nasser's winner in 1956, became Minister of Defense. It's time for action.
The Israelis naturally focused their attention on Sinai. The commanders of the Northern and Central Fronts, David Elazar and Uzi Narkis, were ordered not to respond to Syrian and Jordanian provocations and not to ask for reinforcements. “Grit your teeth and hold on,” Dayan instructed Narkis. Meanwhile, Eshkol, who remained prime minister, sent a letter to King Hussein through the Americans, in which he urged him not to get involved in a war, the consequences of which would be devastating for Jordan. It seemed pointless to explain anything to the Syrians.
On the night of June 3-4 strictly secret! members of the Israeli cabinet voted for war. In order to misinform the enemy, many reservists were given leave on the same day. It turned out so convincingly that foreign correspondents, already exhausted by fruitless waiting, slowly “pulled” away from the country, deciding: Israel had resigned itself to the blockade. The Arabs also believed that they had won again without a fight. And the next morning the thing that started this story happened.
Above the groundGroups of Israeli aircraft rolled in in waves one after another, continuing, as President Johnson aptly put it, to successfully “hunt turkeys.” Hundreds of new, formidable MiGs and Ilovs turned into a pile of burning metal. A third of the Arab pilots simply died, overtaken by bursts from the air. The few who managed to raise their vehicles were shot down even before reaching altitude or hurriedly retreated to remote bases in the interior of the country. And the Israeli planes, returning to their airfields to refuel, were ready to take off again within 7 minutes. (It took the Egyptians several hours even in peacetime.) By noon, the defeat of Nasser’s air force was completely completed. The results exceeded our wildest expectations (Weizmann and Hod were literally jumping for joy). A little later, the same fate befell Jordanian aviation and two-thirds of Syrian aviation.
By the end of the day, the Israelis had already destroyed 416 enemy aircraft against only 26 of their own. Everything happened so quickly that Egypt did not even immediately realize the extent of the disaster. Cairo radio was still broadcasting bravura marches, as well as fake reports about tank divisions rushing to Tel Aviv. People took to the streets for entire blocks, celebrating the victory. Even when the contours of reality began to slowly emerge in the minds of senior officers, they continued to show miracles of incompetence and, in addition, fell into panic. Minister Badran locked himself in his office and refused to come out, Chief of Staff Fauzi feverishly gave orders to non-existent squadrons, Air Force Commander Tzadki Mohammed made theatrical attempts to shoot himself, and Amer at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was seen either drunk or in a drug stupor. Until the evening, no one even dared to inform the president about the sad state of affairs.
Meanwhile, ground fighting began in eastern Sinai and the Gaza Strip. General Israel Tal's division suffered heavy losses, but broke through enemy defenses in the area of Rafah and Khan Yunus, advancing towards Gaza itself. The Egyptians and the Palestinians who joined them defended themselves desperately, but by the next noon the city had fallen. Then Tal immediately moved his main forces towards the administrative center of Sinai El-Arish, and Sharon, meanwhile, had an equally difficult task to break through the defenses in the center of the peninsula and knock out the Egyptian units from the famously inaccessible Abu Aweigila Um-Qataf line. Having surrounded this position after a series of distracting maneuvers, the future Prime Minister of Israel decided to attack in the dark. He believed that his fighters were much better trained for night combat than the Arabs, and he was not mistaken: by morning the enemy retreated. Sharon himself then throughout his life considered the capture of Egyptian fortifications to be the most difficult operation of all carried out by the IDF (Israeli army), and the battle itself was included in all textbooks of military art.
Finally, the third division of General Abraham Ioffe, made up entirely of reservists (their commander himself headed the Society for the Conservation of Nature “in civilian life”), struck in the Jebel Libni area. Having fought against Rommel’s German Afrika Korps, Joffe tried his best to keep up with the regular military in every way. “The Egyptians are wonderful soldiers: disciplined, hardy, but their officers are good for nothing,” Sharon recalled after the war. The latter were indeed famous for their arrogant attitude towards subordinates and obsequious attitude towards their seniors. Finding themselves in an unfamiliar situation, not provided for by plan and directives, they were completely lost, passively waited for instructions, and, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, often fled, abandoning their soldiers to their fate. In the Israeli army, on the contrary, initiative, independence, resourcefulness and respectful relations between all ranks were cultivated. The IDF officers, in the figurative expression of one of them, commanded not “forward!”, but “follow me!” Therefore, by the way, the percentage of Jews among the killed and wounded officers was significantly higher than that of the Arabs they defeated. Defeated, despite the fact that “we did not have a master plan,” as Weizmann admitted, “there were many plans for all occasions, even a plan to capture the North Pole.” Plans are like bricks, from which we and the officers on the battlefield built a building depending on what is happening at the front."
In addition, the Israelis still had a keener sense of what they were fighting for. After all, nothing threatened the existence of the Arab countries, and the Jews knew for sure: in the event of defeat, neither they nor their loved ones would be able to escape. And so, rushing into this last battle, they “rashly” demoralized the enemy. Moreover, according to formal, military indicators, for this latter, even after the loss of aviation, the campaign was not hopelessly lost; the Egyptians could regroup and take up a second line of defense, conducting a targeted counterattack in anticipation of intervention by the international community and a ceasefire. But this required some kind of effective high command, which was absent: even the commanders of the retreating troops in Sinai, at their own peril and risk, tried to organize local defense, but were not supported in any way! Amer, who had finally lost his head and hope, ordered everyone to hastily retreat beyond the Suez Canal, thereby depriving his country of its last chance.
Nasser's divisions rushed to this canal, abandoning expensive and still combat-ready Soviet equipment along the way. However, they did not know: the Mitla and Giddi passes, the main transport routes to Suez, had already been captured by Israeli troops. Two IDF divisions, boldly thrown into the enemy rear in this way, were preparing a deadly trap for the Egyptians, while the third drove them into a trap. Very soon the approaches to the passes turned into a new “Valley of Death” for the Egyptians. Hundreds of tanks burned, several thousand people died, were wounded and captured.
In exactly four days, the Jews managed to defeat seven Egyptian divisions, a 100,000-strong army. Now, being only a few kilometers from the Canal, they could easily advance on Cairo without encountering any resistance. Gamal Abdel Nasser himself later admitted this.
Even in these critical hours, propaganda, which worked much better for the Egyptians than the war machine, continued to feed the nation with fake rosy reports, but this did not make it any easier for the president. Nasser, like Francis I after Pavia, understood: “Everything is lost except honor.” During those days of the war, Israeli intelligence intercepted his conversation with Hussein. The leaders deliberated about who to blame for the successes of the “weak” enemy, and eventually decided to declare that the American and British Air Forces were fighting on the side of Israel!.. By the way, much later, the Jordanian king admitted to deliberately lying and apologized, and Nasser persisted until the end of his life. Moreover, he tried by all available means to convince the Soviet Union of his fantasy, wanting to drag it into the war, but, thank God, in vain: Moscow, naturally, had its own information sources.
Meanwhile, the most important events in this short-lived conflict took place in the West Bank and Jerusalem. As is known, in 1948, during the first disengagement with the Palestinians, the Israelis failed to retain the eastern part of this ancient capital, which included the Old City with its holiest places of three religions. With international mediation, Jerusalem was divided between the Israeli state and Jordan, and the Jews lost access to their main shrine, the Western Wall. This loss was more than sensitive for the national ideology. Of course, they dreamed of returning all of Jerusalem, but in this case they were afraid of a war on two fronts and sincerely hoped that Jordan would limit itself to only a symbolic expression of solidarity with the pan-Arab military duty. However, as already noted, King Hussein initially decided to fight and now ordered artillery bombardment of the western part of the city and the entire coastal valley of Israel. Its width at its narrowest point reached only 15 kilometers; having attacked, the Jordanians could well have cut the enemy’s territory in two.The heavy damage inflicted on Jordanian aviation, of course, cooled the ardor of the “hawks” in Amman, but it was too late to call it quits. The Arab Legion, under the command of General Riad, has already launched a full-fledged campaign.
At the very beginning of the fighting, when all attention was focused on Sinai, the commander of the Central Front, Uzi Narkis, acted according to the original order given when Eshkol and Dayan still hoped to avoid war: to hold back the onslaught of the attackers and not to launch a counter-offensive, even if it seemed possible . However, as soon as the victory over Egypt became obvious, it was decided to radically change the disposition: the landing brigade of Colonel Mota Gur, transferred from Sinai, came under the control of Narkis, and Israeli tank crews attacked the Jordanians in Judea and Samaria. The Jerusalem garrison, led by General Ata Ali, defended itself quite skillfully and very desperately; the Jews suffered heavy losses. However, better training and complete air supremacy did their job - all the reinforcements that went to help the besieged were destroyed on the outskirts of the city.
After heavy fighting for the Police School and Arsenal Hill, which became the “Stalingrad” of the Six Day War for the Israelis, Gur’s paratroopers surrounded the Old City. Finally, in a voice breaking with excitement, Gur was able to report to Narkis: “The Temple Mount is in our hands.” After a 19-year break, the Jews again found themselves at their Wall. In the square in front of her, the shooting had not yet subsided, and the IDF chief rabbi had already rushed to the shrine to recite the Kaddish memorial prayer for the dead, blow the shofar ritual bugle made of a ram's horn in honor of the victory, and announce to “the city and the world”: “I, General Shlomo Goren, the chief rabbi of the Israeli army, came to this place never to leave it again.” And although the main battles of the Six Day War took place in the Sinai, its history was undoubtedly made here.
On the same day, Israeli troops completed the capture of the West Bank, driving the Jordanians out of Bethlehem, Hebron and Nablus. After this, the parties agreed to a ceasefire.
As often happens, although Syria was more responsible for the start of the war than other countries, Damascus itself was in no hurry to get involved in the battle. In the first days, the Syrians limited themselves to only artillery strikes on the border zone and local raids, which, however, were easily repulsed. Israel, for its part, still fearing an armed conflict with the USSR, was also afraid to move forward decisively. However, when the scale of the Israeli successes in other theaters of war became known, the commander of the Northern Front, David Elazar, tried to convince his government to put an end to the Syrian “robbery” once and for all. Eshkol, although he himself was a member of the northern kibbutz Dganiya, which suffered from this robbery, as usual, hesitated. In the end, the ministers came to the general conclusion that another such opportunity would never arise, and Dayan gave the order to attack. On the morning of June 9, under a scorching sun and a hail of bullets, the Israelis moved up the bare basalt slopes, the name of which has since become known throughout the world: the Golan Heights. Many of these soldiers grew up in northern settlements and survived more than one Syrian shelling, so there was no need to fear for their morale. Meanwhile, Syrian batteries continued to stubbornly fire at civilian targets and not at troops, driving Soviet instructors into a frenzy. However, by evening the Arab defenses were broken through. At 19.30 the next day they had to retreat from the Heights. The last opponent of the Jewish state admitted his military insolvency.
So, a complete triumph - it is unlikely that any state on Earth in the 1960s would have had more reasons for national pride than Israel did in those days. Of course, he also has his own “skeletons in the closet.” Let's say, Jews prefer not to remember how on June 8, 1967, their friendship with the Americans was seriously tested: on the high seas, at a distance of 23 kilometers from the Sinai coast, planes and torpedo boats with Stars of David “accidentally” attacked an American reconnaissance vessel.” Liberty", mistaking it for the Egyptian "El-Quseir". 34 sailors were killed and 170 were injured. Why this happened God knows, most likely, we are really talking about an accident, although to this day there are lovers of more subtle conspiracy interpretations. The Israelis also do not like to remember that dozens of their soldiers and officers were covered with their own artillery support. “The artillery hits its own people” - this, alas, happens in every war.
A week and forty yearsIDF losses throughout its victorious six-day march amounted to about 800 killed and 2,500 wounded. The Arabs, in addition to large territories, irretrievably lost a total of more than 15,000, tens of thousands more ended up in hospitals, and 6,000 (including 21 generals) in prisoner of war camps. The Egyptian army completely lost 80% of all weapons. The Arab world experienced a shock and plunged into a long-term depression, and the balance of power in the region changed significantly. The further goals of the parties have also changed. If before 1967 the Arabs uncompromisingly sought to destroy the State of Israel, now they had to think only about returning the territories lost in the war. The Jewish state, in turn, began to take care of keeping them for itself, and if it returned them, it was only in exchange for recognition of its right to exist.
This memorable war was in many ways, of course, an episode of another, global Cold War, where each superpower supported its clients and took care of their interests. The battlefields of the Middle East served as an excellent testing ground for Soviet and American weapons. However, the grandees of world politics had to swallow a bitter pill: their influence turned out to be by no means limitless - after all, neither the USSR nor the USA wanted bloodshed, but Moscow was unable to keep Egypt and Syria from it, and Washington was unable to keep Israel from it. But whose reputation has really suffered critically is the reputation of the UN. The official guarantor of world security has completely failed in this role. The Security Council and the General Assembly have since become a forum for making mutual accusations and claims - nothing more. All serious issues began to be resolved “bypassing” them, so it’s even surprising: why modern journalists complain so much about the loss of the real power of the United Nations, because it was lost a long time ago.
In the meantime, the USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. Many Arab countries have recalled their ambassadors even from Washington. The Suez Canal was closed to shipping for several years, which led to an increase in world oil prices. Very soon, clashes between Israel and Egypt began again in the area; historians later “combined” them into the War of Attrition. Desperate to regain Sinai by force of arms, Cairo concluded a peace treaty with Tel Aviv. The peninsula returned to Egyptian hands, and the inviolability of the Israeli state from the southwest was now guaranteed. The Golan Heights and the West Bank of Jordan are still controlled by Israel. The struggle between Jews and Palestinian Arabs for the deserts of Judea, the hills of Samaria and the holy sites of Jerusalem has not subsided since those fateful days in June 1967. When the last battle will take place and the last victim of this endless Six-Day War will die is unknown.
