Nikolai Petrov: “We hit five craters”
At the beginning of last year, the head of the Center for Political Geographical Research, political scientist Nikolai Petrov, in his report “Russia in a tailspin: what alternatives does Putin have left,” made several rather resonant and non-standard forecasts about the future of the country. He said that the current regime had a year and a half left and that if Russia did not return fair elections, then with Putin’s departure any well-organized force could take power, including the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. MK talked to Nikolai Petrov and asked how he came to such conclusions, why the forecasts have not yet come true and how events could develop further.
- At the beginning of last year, you compared Russia to a plane in a tailspin, which will either fall apart in the air or crash on the ground. You said that the existing political regime has almost completely exhausted the resources to preserve it and will change in a year and a half. But this didn't happen?
The main thing about the idea of a plane in a tailspin is that we have found ourselves in a trajectory from which we cannot escape on our own, because the decisions that were made in 2014 seem irreversible. Then three possible scenarios were considered. The first is the use of an external push. On the one hand, we cannot replay everything, return Crimea and say “sorry.” On the other hand, no one can forgive us for what we did without changing the rules of the game. But there is turbulence everywhere, we do not live alone and we see what problems Western countries face. Therefore, we can expect that some serious shift in the European Union, say the exit of Great Britain and everything that begins after that, or the results of the presidential elections in the United States, could change the rules of the game, give us a serious push and throw us out of this trajectory.
The second option is collapse; if we don’t have time to do anything, the plane hits the ground. And the third is the replacement of the pilot by the elites and the restoration of relations with the West.
Over the course of a year and a half, the ratio of probabilities of these three options has changed slightly. The latter seems unlikely. Putin's new military leadership legitimacy made him less dependent on the political elites. But the likelihood of exiting the tailspin has increased through external shocks combined with our internal efforts. On the one hand, we see turbulence both in the West and everywhere. On the other hand, the government has largely abandoned anti-Western rhetoric and is trying to modernize the political system - these are elections in single-mandate constituencies and primaries of United Russia. I would expect further serious steps after the Duma elections.
But I would say that these actions are very slow. Whether the system will be able to transform itself from the inside and become more adequate to existing conditions or will fall apart because it will not have time or will not be able to do this is a matter of time.
In last year’s report, when discussing what could happen after Vladimir Putin’s departure, you modeled two scenarios: someone from the special services or Ramzan Kadyrov could rise to power. The second option, at least at first glance, looks fantastic. No one before you has made such statements in all seriousness.
We need to start with the fact that in our country there is not one personalist regime, but two. The first is Putin. The second is Kadyrov, who is connected with Putin by some kind of vassal agreements, but nothing more. And when Putin was not president, Kadyrov openly declared that he was not loyal to the president of the Russian Federation, that he was loyal to Putin personally. Therefore, Putin’s departure puts this group in a very difficult position.
When I said that his participation in the struggle for power after Putin is quite real, I meant this participation in two possible qualities. The first is the kingmaker, in our case the kingmaker, is a person whose participation determines the fate of the crown. And secondly, this is a contender for the crown itself. In a scenario in which the leader or his high popularity disappears, there is no basis for preserving the system: there is no basis for preserving institutions, there are no regional political elites who were able to preserve the system in the 90s, when Yeltsin was greatly weakened, there are no autonomous politicians who enjoy the authority of citizens.
They all shine with light reflected from Putin. We don’t really consider it serious that Medvedev’s popularity does not depend on Putin’s popularity. When the sun goes down, all these moons go out, all these politicians disappear. Who remains: Shoigu, who has grown a lot lately, and Kadyrov.
And in this situation of political desert, power will not necessarily be taken by a large, but well-organized force that will act quickly. It could be a party like the Bolsheviks. But we don’t have such a party. A year and a half ago it seemed that the nationalists could fulfill this role, because they could quickly field a large number of people who could decide the question of power. It doesn't seem that way today. That leaves either the special services or Kadyrov, who is also a kind of special service. His uniqueness also lies in the fact that he is both the head of the region and the head of the security structure. He has much fewer bayonets than the others. But they are more obedient and ready to carry out any order.
I would not consider it an accident that over the past one and a half to two years we have seen the transformation of Kadyrov from a small Caucasian autocrat into a figure of national and global scale. He organizes some gigantic Muslim rallies about what is happening in Paris, he makes foreign policy statements, he goes to the Middle East. He pursues a foreign policy that is not pursued by any of our regional leaders, and maintains a very high level of publicity all the time.
But how is it purely physically possible for the transfer of power into his hands? His rating is not so high; in January, the Levada Center recorded that respect and sympathy for Kadyrov among the population decreased from 35% to 17%. What, “50 thousand Kadyrov’s bayonets” will take power? Will they storm the Kremlin?
50 thousand bayonets will not be needed, and there is no need to storm anything. In our country, since 1991, a new leader has never come to power as a result of elections. This was always a decision of the elite, which was then accompanied by a vote. In the event of Putin’s departure or his legitimacy, either some of the most active forces participating in this struggle will agree among themselves and present us with a new leader, or they will use the existing formal framework, announce elections and present us with a candidate.
They will most likely be the one who can consolidate a controlling blocking stake within the power elite. I see Kadyrov as such a candidate, who should not be viewed as an outcast who is at odds with all the security forces. He has allies in the federal security forces; these coalitions are not visible today, but they will instantly appear at the decisive moment.
But, according to the widespread version, the creation of the National Guard, among other things, was aimed at removing the Chechen security forces from the control of Kadyrov; the use of combat-ready units is now carried out in agreement with the director of the Federal Service of the National Guard Troops, Viktor Zolotov. Is this not an attempt to weaken Kadyrov's influence?
This version is hardly worth taking seriously, because Kadyrov’s power over all formations in Chechnya is not formal, but real. If, as you saw on YouTube, he can reprimand the generals who are sent by the federal center and give them orders, then what grounds do we have to believe that this can happen with the internal troops, but this will not happen with the National Guard?
Maybe Kadyrov’s conflict with FSB head Bortnikov served as some kind of impetus. But I would say that the task of the National Guard is still to restore balance within the security bloc and eliminate the sharply increased influence of the FSB, and occupy the security forces with their own problems in order to minimize their participation in everything else.
But does Kadyrov have such ambitions? Yes, he makes statements that not only Chechnya is important to him, but all of Russia. But he is still active internationally in the Muslim world, traveling to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Bahrain. Does he need the whole country, the majority of whose population considers themselves Orthodox?
Sometimes such reasoning seems very naive to me. How can a giant Orthodox country be ruled by a non-Russian person? After Stalin, this looks like a rather ridiculous argument. It is important to look at what is really happening. If we saw Kadyrov, isolated in Chechnya and its problems, or at least in the North Caucasus, then we could talk about whether he has ambitions of a higher level or not.
He shows that for him there is neither the Ministry of Internal Affairs nor the FSB, that he can change the head of the court if for some reason he is inconvenient. This can be done for only one purpose - to demonstrate their power at the country level and beyond its borders.
Kadyrov is one of the ten most popular federal politicians, this is no coincidence. The May rating of VTsIOM puts him next to Patriarch Kirill, this is partly the answer to your question, and Valentina Matvienko. Yes, naturally, he does not go to Washington yet, because the US President does not invite him. And in the Muslim world today it plays an increasingly important role. And the situation with Syria played into his hands.
Kadyrov is also loved outside the Muslim world, although there is a significant Muslim world in our country. They love him because he is a statesman, because he is young, because he is energetic, because he acts in a way that many citizens like, without looking at the law or what they will say in the West.
Plus, Kadyrov has not only a power structure, but also a network structure, because unlike other governors, he has a network of businesses connected with him in one way or another, including semi-criminal ones, in other regions. And through these communities and businesses, he no longer controls only the North Caucasus, but also other regions.
Therefore, he deserves attention as an influential political player.
You said that the probability of exiting the tailspin through external points in combination with our internal efforts has now increased. Is the “reboot” of the Central Election Commission such an effort: replacing Churov with Pamfilova, canceling the elections in Barvikha, a course towards interaction with observers, the resignation of several heads of regional election commissions? Will this save the regime?
This is a positive step. Although I do not see it as a fundamental change in the government’s position regarding the elections. Rather, it suggests that the authorities are again concerned about their image. The question arises for whom she is creating it. It is difficult to find an addressee within the country, at least these are not protesters or the liberal intelligentsia, whom the authorities are trying to ignore, making it seem like this is a minimal minority and there is no need to listen to it.
In my opinion, what is happening with the Central Election Commission is a demonstration of steps that are well received in the West, which are necessary today to try to get out of confrontation and out of a tailspin.
But there is also a certain game in front of the protesters. Still, their numbers were high, and one of the main demands was fair elections and Churov’s resignation. Now the authorities, even despite the fact that other “black” technologies are still used, can say: here are fair elections for you.
Let me draw your attention to the fact that, in parallel with the changes in the Central Election Commission, the screws on election observation are being tightened. People are not particularly concerned about what the balance of parties in the State Duma will be; people are worried about the overt rudeness of the authorities towards them. You are right, the authorities are afraid of protests. Therefore, the fewer observers, the less information about this kind of rudeness and the less the danger of such a negative social reaction for the authorities.
On the other hand, you saw the scheme for dividing single-member constituencies. She does not say that the authorities want to co-opt the urban voter. The calculation is made that the rural population will provide the desired result. And then power will be gained by the Duma, where there will be deputies loyal to local or federal authorities, but the most active part of the electorate will not be represented or will be extremely underrepresented. And this conflict is potentially very dangerous. When you exclude a potentially powerful player from the political system, you drive the situation into a corner. Because in order for this player to be heard, he will again have to go to mass protests.
- And what steps, in your opinion, can the Russian government take to save the system?
The option that seems simple to me is for the Kremlin to announce after the State Duma elections that we won, proved to the West that we are great and everyone takes us into account, and now our main problem is the economy and the crisis. We must achieve economic growth and for this we will cooperate with the West to some extent. Putin needs support for his radical economic reform program.
But the last 16 years give us no reason to seriously hope that Putin is capable of this. During this time, the government did not take any radical steps other than what we saw in 2014, but it was a completely different coordinate system.
Why is there no reason to believe that Putin appointed Kudrin to the Central Socialist Republic precisely to develop an economic program for the presidential elections?
The authorities are simultaneously playing out different options; they take a step in one direction, then two in the other. And last week it was announced the creation of a presidential council on economic strategy, the presidium of which will be headed by Medvedev. And we now know whether there will be Kudrin, there will be Medvedev, there will be Glazyev or Belousov, and everyone will send their signals to their audience, Kudrin to the liberals and the West, Glazyev to the statists, Medvedev to the officials. This is not a trick, the authorities do it easily and gracefully, but the trick is to take a sharp step. That's why it's harsh, because it deprives you of freedom of maneuver. But Putin, it seems to me, is psychologically a Libra - a person who wants to preserve all possibilities for as long as possible and not make a choice for as long as possible, which strictly cuts off all other options.
If there is no “change of pilot” and the government does not take drastic economic steps, then by 2018 could the scenario of collapse and destruction of the system become relevant?
Now I would describe the tailspin as five funnels in which the country fell. They spiral downwards and quickly lead us to the bottom. The first is the overconcentration of power in the hands of one person. Roughly speaking, the situation develops as in physics with a black hole, when the mass begins to be drawn into one point faster and faster, and then an explosion occurs. The second is the exhaustion of resources for military mobilization legitimacy. There is no second Crimea, and if you look at Putin’s ratings, you will see that neither Syria nor Turkey had almost any influence on his popularity. The third funnel is manual control. Not only is it problematic in itself in such a huge country as ours, it is fraught with the fact that at all levels of the system there are people who are only able to transmit a signal from top to bottom and are not able to make decisions and take responsibility. The fourth is a sharply shrinking planning horizon. Moreover, in case of instability, long-term investments are unprofitable not only in the economy, but also in politics. Why do we see so many political parties and the reluctance of their leaders to agree with each other? Because long projects don't work. You cannot expect that today you are fifth, in three years you will be first. It’s better to be first in your micro-party today than fifth in a large one, because in three years everything will change tenfold.
But if you are always doing cosmetic repairs and have not fixed the sewer pipes for 20 years, then when they start leaking in 20 years, you will not have enough money to put them in order overnight. This is exactly how it is in our economy and politics. And fifth are intra-elite conflicts. They become more dangerous, and the system loses the last institutions that helped solve them automatically. Each time they need to be resolved manually. It is necessary to create the National Guard to restore balance between the security forces.
When all these five funnels work together, they have a negative synergistic effect. But there is no rigid set point in which you can say in 10 days or 10 years everything will collapse. We can only say that both the risks and the fatigue of the system are increasing all the time.
He does not intend to participate in the Russian presidential elections in 2012. Such a statement by Kadyrov forced the appearance of a website on the Internet in support of him as a candidate for the presidency of the country.
“I never - neither in my dreams nor in reality - thought about running for office anywhere,” Kadyrov said.
Kadyrov, indeed, never took part in elections. In 2006, he was appointed by the then President of Chechnya, Alu Alkhanov, to the post of Prime Minister of Chechnya, and in 2007, by decree of the Russian President, he was appointed to Alkhanov’s place.
The website kadyrov2012.com states that “unlike the Federal Assembly and the Government, which play an auxiliary role in governing the country, the first person of our country is historically a symbol of state policy.” The appeal to citizens states that Kadyrov should become such a symbol, since he is “perhaps the only young leader on the territory of the Russian Federation who demonstrates positive management experience.”
“That is why the overwhelming majority of our citizens would like to see such a political leader as the head of state. Only a person of Kadyrov’s level has sufficient experience and potential to overcome the negative trends of recent decades,” the anonymous authors of the site campaign for Kadyrov.
In their opinion, Kadyrov is “a worthy presidential candidate,” and his “nomination is a real step towards the future of our Motherland.”
Kadyrov himself is confident that the site was developed not by his fans, but by militants who came up with new tactics to fight him. “This is a vile provocation of people or forces who do not disdain anything. I am firmly convinced that the most inveterate enemies of the Chechen people and Russia are behind this,” Kadyrov said.
He recalled that “until now, methods of terror, murder, and sabotage have been used, but these gangs have been defeated, and only a small remnant is running around the mountains, which will also come to an end in the very near future.” “They are trying by any means to cast a shadow on the leadership of the Chechen Republic and the region as a whole,” Kadyrov said. The head of Chechnya considered a website in support of Kadyrov in the presidential elections in 2012 to be “the most sophisticated method for carrying out dirty provocations.”
There is no imprint on the site, and the President of Chechnya did not provide any evidence that the site was made specifically by militants, and not by supporters of Kadyrov (in Chechnya, for example, there is an official Ramzan fan club) or jokers.
The portal quickly gained popularity. On Saturday, there were up to 300 people on it at the same time. To the question “Will you support Kadyrov in the 2012 elections?” More than 11 thousand people have already responded.
So far, only 37% are ready to see Kadyrov as president of Russia; another 59% will vote for another candidate.
In the “Position” section, Kadyrov is praised by the prime minister and the first deputy head. There are photos, videos and even a mini-chat. In addition, the developers offer to support them with money. You can send a paid SMS (from 4 to 250 rubles) or transfer funds to a special account.
Increasingly, the head of the Chechen Republic can be seen on television screens and print media, so the question of whether Kadyrov will become president of Russia in 2018 worries many citizens. And although there is no information yet about whether Ramzan Akhmatovich will run for the post of head of state, it is obvious that the Kremlin is promoting this person in the Russian political arena. This, in turn, gives rise to thoughts that Kadyrov is being groomed to become Putin’s successor.
People's opinions are divided on whether the head of Chechnya can become president of Russia in 2018. Political scientists are also ambiguous in their answers to this question. One thing is certain, if Putin decides to run for another term, then other candidates, including Kadyrov, have no chance. But everyone understands perfectly well that the current head cannot rule the country indefinitely, and someone else will come to replace him. And that someone could be Ramzan Akhmatovich.
Recently, his persona has been noticeably advancing not only in the political arena, but also among ordinary people. A couple of years ago, Ramzan Kadyrov was an ordinary chump for Russian citizens, but now he is positioned as a hero of Russia, a true patriot. According to the latest data from surveys conducted across the country, the following picture emerges:
The popularity of the head of Chechnya is largely due to the Kremlin. There are rumors that he is actively preparing to become the next Russian president, although there is no official evidence of this yet.
Assurances that Ramzan Kadyrov will become president of Russia in 2018 may seem unfounded, but is everything so transparent? If Putin decides to leave, he will need to hand over his business to someone. The current head is surrounded by only old people. The youngest is Dmitry Medvedev, but he does not have the spirit of a fighter and without Putin’s support he cannot cope with this role.
Kadyrov is a completely different matter. A strong, strong-willed and principled person who can easily continue military operations, but at the same time have respect among the population. Despite the fact that the head of Chechnya is determined to radically solve emerging problems, often with the help of force and weapons, there are quite a few adherents.
Many people talk about who would allow a Chechen to rule the country, but Kadyrov’s rating and authority are constantly growing. In addition, if we look at the situation in more detail, it becomes clear that the Chechen Republic has a great influence on Russian politics. In addition, it receives a large number of subsidies and permits, for example, Chechens are allowed to live not according to the Constitution, but according to Sharia. Some political scientists say that Kadyrov has long had a strong influence on the Kremlin and dictates his own terms of the game, and the Government agrees that Chechnya remains part of the Federation, since in the event of hostilities, it will be quite difficult to maintain the republic.
Political scientists are vigorously debating what Kadyrov's chances of victory are if he decides to run for president. If you take a closer look at the situation, the following categories of people can vote for him:
All the heroism and patriotism of Ramzan Akhmatovich was created artificially. If we assume that he does become president, the country will face a strong dictatorship. This can be judged by the measures that Chechens take when governing the republic. To fight those who do not support his views and methods of government, Kadyrov uses force and does not even try to hide it. Millions of rallies in his support are just a fiction created artificially.
There are practically no people among the population who believe that a Chechen can come to power. Although one of the political scientists said that Kadyrov will become Putin’s best successor, and that he will come to power, but not now. Of all those around the current head, he is the only one who will be able to complete all of Putin’s started global projects, including those aimed at expanding the territory.
According to the political scientist, this will happen not in 2018, but in 2024, after Putin serves another term. And although it seems that Kadyrov cannot become president, everything could be different, so only time will tell who was right and whether the Chechen has a chance to become head of state.
Ramzan Kadyrov has become the acting head of Chechnya and will most likely take part in the republican elections in September. According to experts, Kadyrov is unlikely to have competitors: almost 100% of citizens vote for the current government in Chechnya
Ramzan Kadyrov, appointed acting head of Chechnya, during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin on March 25, 2016 (Photo: Mikhail Klimentyev/TASS)
On Friday, March 25, President Vladimir Putin met with the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, and signed a decree on his appointment as acting head of the region. Kadyrov will remain in this status until the elections in the republic, which are scheduled to take place on September 18 on a single voting day. Putin noted that he expects that Kadyrov will take part in them.
Putin called on Kadyrov to interact more actively with the federal center on issues ensuring security and called for compliance with Russian laws. “Both you and the future leaders of the republic, of course, must do everything to comply with Russian laws in all spheres of our life. I want to emphasize this: in all spheres of our life,” the president noted.
Relations with security forces
Kadyrov’s actions more than once ran counter to the position of the federal security forces. In April 2015, Kadyrov, at a meeting with Chechen law enforcement officials, called on law enforcement officers from other regions who were trying to conduct any special operation in Chechnya without coordination with the Chechen authorities.
Kadyrov decided to openly attack the federal security forces because of the operation carried out in Grozny by employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Stavropol Territory and the temporary operational group, which is based in Khankala. Then the suspect in the case of causing grievous bodily harm, Dzhambulat Dadaev, was killed. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs called Kadyrov's statement unacceptable.
The Investigative Committee for Chechnya opened a criminal case on the fact that Stavropol police officers exceeded their official powers, but the Chairman of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, overturned this decision. The Investigative Committee conducted an inspection and recognized the special operation of the Stavropol police as legal.
In February 2016, Putin dismissed the head of the investigative department of the Investigative Committee for Chechnya, Sergei Devyatov, from his post.
Putin’s words that the head of Chechnya must comply with federal legislation were also connected with the case of the murder of politician Boris Nemtsov, in which people from the security forces of Chechnya are involved, political scientist Alexei Makarkin suggested in a conversation with RBC. In the Kremlin, according to Makarkin, they certainly took into account that the federal security forces are still the alleged organizer of Nemtsov’s murder, Ruslan Geremeev, who, according to media reports, was hiding in Chechnya and the United Arab Emirates.
Kadyrov’s intervention in the affairs of Ingushetia is also indicative for the Kremlin, Makarkin points out. He recalls that Kadyrov openly sided with the imam of Ingushetia in his confrontation with the head of the republic, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who, on the eve of the Spiritual Center, had religious leaders elect a new imam.
Election activity
Recently, Kadyrov has repeatedly spoken out in the media about his political future. In an interview with NTV on February 27, he suggested that the time had come to leave the post of head of Chechnya. “Now, so that my name is not used against my people, I believe that the state leadership needs to find another person,” he noted. In an interview with Interfax on March 2, Kadyrov said that he would carry out any decision of the president. “Any decision on this issue is made by Russian President Vladimir Putin. And I’m an infantryman who will say “yes,” he emphasized.
At the same time, Kadyrov began to regularly speak out about the opposition. On January 12, a message appeared on the website of the Chechen government in which he called for treating the non-systemic opposition as “enemies of the people.” Regarding these statements, St. Petersburg deputy Maxim Reznik contacted the Prosecutor General's Office, asking the supervisory agency to check Kadyrov's words for extremism. On March 23, the prosecutor of Chechnya, Sharpuddi Abdul-Kadyrov, said that the republic's prosecutor's office in Kadyrov's statements were manifestations of extremism.
On January 22, a rally in support of Kadyrov was held in Grozny. The organizers, the Council of Trade Unions of the Chechen Republic, announced on the eve of the rally that they intended to gather 750 thousand people at the main mosque of the republic, “The Heart of Chechnya.” More than 1 million people, according to the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs, gathered in Grozny on March 23 at a rally in honor of Constitution Day of Chechnya.
Kadyrov’s activity and his harsh rhetoric towards the opposition were an attempt, on the one hand, to push the Kremlin to make a political decision, and on the other, to force the Chechen elite to once again swear loyalty to Kadyrov and consolidate around him, says political scientist Alexander Kynev.
According to Beslan Uspanov, editor-in-chief of the Kavpolit portal, Chechnya is the only region in the North Caucasus that still has direct elections for the head of the region; in other republics, the leader is chosen by the parliament on the proposal of the president.
Elections in Chechen style
For the first time, the parliament approved Kadyrov as head of Chechnya on March 2, 2007 for a period of four years. At the end of 2007, a nationwide referendum was held in the republic on the issue of introducing an amendment to the Constitution to increase the term of office of the head of the region and parliament. For the second time, Kadyrov became the head of Chechnya on March 5, 2011 - then he was appointed to lead Chechnya for five years.
The first elections for the head of Chechnya will be held in September this year, in which Kadyrov may take part.
As a rule, elections in Chechnya are characterized by high turnout. Votes for the current government in Chechnya were constantly growing: in 2003, in the State Duma elections, 80.91% of the region's population voted for the United Russia party, in 2007 - 99.36%, in 2011 - 99.48% . 92.3% of Chechens voted for Vladimir Putin in the 2004 presidential elections. For Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 - 88.7%. And in 2012, 99.76% of the electorate already voted for Putin.
It is impossible to assess the degree to which the election results in Chechnya correspond to real public sentiment, since the republic is outside electoral control, says Kynev. “But it is simply impossible to get such results in elections,” the expert is sure. The political scientist does not undertake to predict the results of the elections for the head of Chechnya, noting that the results will be “the way the Chechen authorities want to see them.”
There are no alternative figures to Kadyrov either in the republic or in Russia, Kynev emphasizes. Those who can publicly oppose Kadyrov with something are abroad or in the marginal field, Kynev clarifies.
In this case, there will be elections, says political scientist Konstantin Kalachev. It will be difficult to persuade someone to act as a spoiler to demonstrate competitiveness, and technical candidates may campaign not for themselves, but for Kadyrov, he notes.
Most likely, in addition to Kadyrov, his closest associates may run, such as the current speaker of the Chechen parliament Magomed Daudov, who previously headed Kadyrov’s administration, and United Russia State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov, suggests Uspanov.
Earlier, RBC sources close to the presidential administration said that Moscow, for many reasons, did not see an alternative to the current head of Chechnya. Kadyrov is a strong politician, he suits the federal leadership and enjoys authority in the region, a federal official familiar with the discussion of the future leadership of Chechnya explained to RBC the bet on Kadyrov in the Kremlin.
What are the chances of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov becoming Vladimir Putin’s successor, the site found out.
The head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, firmly holds the title of Russia's main newsmaker. One political scandal involving him follows another. Either he, as the site wrote, announces oppositionists, then he gathers his support in Grozny, then he points a computer at Mikhail Kasyanov.
Kadyrov’s actions and statements are supported by a relatively harmonious chorus of politicians, cultural figures and pro-government political scientists. The liberal public, in turn, is ringing all the bells, accusing the politician of inciting violence or making direct threats against dissidents.
As a result, as follows from the rating of the Agency for Political and Economic Communications and Nezavisimaya Gazeta “100 Leading Politicians of Russia in January 2016”, the leader of Chechnya occupies 44th position in this hundred, having added 15 points over the year.
It seems that at this rate, Ramzan Kadyrov may soon catch up with his patron, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who invariably tops this rating. Already now, some writing and thinking people are thinking quite seriously about Kadyrov’s presidential prospects, and on the streets they are conducting a survey about whether Ramzan Akhmatovich can become Vladimir Vladimirovich’s successor.
the site decided to ask deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation about whether Ramzan Kadyrov could take control of the country into his own hands. First of all, we called parliamentarians who took part in the political flash mob “Kadyrov is a patriot of Russia.” But unfortunately, the servants of the people did not find the time or desire to discuss this promising topic.
For example, the assistant to the secretary of the general council of the United Russia party, vice-speaker of the State Duma Sergei Neverov, said that her boss does not always have enough time even for serious matters, not to mention such trifles. One can only wonder how Neverov, meanwhile, found time to pose in front of the camera with a piece of paper “#Kadyrov”...
At the same time, the parliamentarian seemed to remember all the political science textbooks he knew and spent all his diplomatic efforts not to say anything unnecessary or “inflaming.” Speaking about Ramzan Kadyrov's presidential prospects, the liberal democrat emphasized theory and did not get personal.
Shingarkin said that Ramzan Akhmatovich, like any other Russian citizen who has reached the age of 35, has every right to stand for and be elected as the President of the Russian Federation, and neither Kadyrov’s ethnicity nor religious views can prevent him from taking the main position of the country.
Moreover, Kadyrov has a serious chance of actually becoming president: according to Shingarkin, the head of Chechnya has one of the two main conditions for election to the role of national leader - colossal fame.
If we are talking about Kadyrov, then it is quite obvious that he is known to the overwhelming majority of voters. His personal qualities are clear, his life path is clear. If we compare him with the leaders of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, formed on a national basis, of course, he has the highest recognition. If we are talking in general about the heads of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, then it is possible that here too he is in a very narrow group of leaders. He is perhaps one of three whom all Russians know: [Moscow Mayor Sergei] Sobyanin, [Moscow Region Governor Andrei] Vorobyov and Kadyrov,” said Maxim Shingarkin.
Our interlocutor did not express any doubt that Ramzan Kadyrov, purely theoretically, could become the President of the Russian Federation. However, he noted that the Chechen leader still lacks federal competence, which is the key to popular trust.
To become president, one must have the highest federal competence. And for this you need to be either a federal minister, or a deputy prime minister, or a prime minister for a long time. You can also be the head of one of the chambers of the Federal Assembly or the head of one of the largest departments: the Ministry of Defense, the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Shingarkin explained.
Maxim Shingarkin / Official website of Maxim Shingarkin
Thus, the deputy brought us to the conclusion that it will be possible to talk about Kadyrov’s presidential ambitions no earlier than before the elections in 2024. Because until this time, a politician will hardly be able to occupy and hold out for a long time in the place of a federal manager.
Let us note, by the way, that the caution of our interlocutors is quite understandable if we recall, for example, the fate of the Krasnoyarsk deputy, who first called Kadyrov “a disgrace to Russia” for his attack on the opposition, and then publicly apologized to him.
Journalist and political scientist Leonid Radzikhovsky spoke much less reservedly about President Kadyrov. According to our interlocutor, it is pointless to talk about such a political rise of the head of Chechnya, since most Russians perceive him as an outsider:
The last thing that can happen in Russia is that, firstly, a non-Russian person will become president, secondly, that it will be a Chechen, and thirdly, that it will be Kadyrov.
Radzikhovsky noted that now only one non-Russian person can easily become the president of Russia - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who has lived and worked in Moscow for a long time. The Russians consider him theirs, the journalist is sure:
This has absolutely nothing to do with Kadyrov. And although he repeats everything that central television says, he only repeats it several octaves higher, several times louder and, most importantly, shaking his machine gun (which gives additional weight to Kiselyov’s speeches), nevertheless, even those people who vigorously applaud him and they say: “That’s right, we need to shoot this *** [colloquial expletive],” - they will never accept a Chechen - who, by the way, fought against the Russian army - a man who is an Islamic fundamentalist, even as a candidate for the presidency of Russia. This option would really mean a real rebellion and a real civil war or a third Chechen war. I am absolutely sure that Kadyrov understands this perfectly, Putin understands this perfectly.
Leonid Radzikhovsky believes that Kadyrov has not shown himself to be the most successful regional leader, since he was unable to fully command in the North Caucasus and exert political dominance in the close and related Ingushetia - and if Kadyrov did not manage to fully become the master of the region, then what is he to do with the master all over the country...
