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On January 4, 2000, Gromov was appointed press secretary to the acting president of the Russian Federation, and from March to President Vladimir Putin, replacing Dmitry Yakushkin in this post, who remained to serve as press secretary under Yeltsin after his resignation.
On March 26, 2004, after Putin was re-elected for a second term, Gromov was reaffirmed in his position.
In 2001, Gromov joined the board of directors of ORT OJSC, and in 2004 he became a member of Channel One OJSC, which replaced him. In 2005, Gromov and advisor to the President of the Russian Federation and ex-Minister of Press Mikhail Lesin initiated the creation of a 24-hour English-language channel Russia Today (RTTV), designed to promote the formation of a positive image of Russia in the world. The founder of RTTV was RIA Novosti, the total annual budget of the new structure was $30 million, and Margarita Simonyan, who had previously worked as a Kremlin correspondent on the Rossiya TV channel, was approved as the head.
The media noted that Gromov became the curator of the created channel.
In November 2006, Gromov was mentioned in the media in connection with an incident that occurred at the CIS summit in Minsk. The Belarusian authorities refused to allow three Russian journalists to attend the event, who they believed were incorrectly reporting on their activities.
Gromov’s attempts to gain access to journalists were unsuccessful. As a result, almost all representatives of the Russian media left the summit as a sign of solidarity with their colleagues.
Observers noted Gromov's non-publicity as the president's press secretary. Despite this, in 2000 he became a laureate of the Ogonyok magazine award “for ensuring the Kremlin’s information openness.” Gromov speaks Czech, Slovak and English. Collects figurines of gnomes. He is married and has two sons - Alexey and Danila.
People who worked with Alexei Gromov characterize him as a tough leader. Gromov’s responsibilities as head of the press service included not only direct work with the press, but also the preparation of round-the-clock information and digests about materials in print and electronic media. Alexey Gromov was also responsible for making public various documents signed by the Russian President.
Alexey Gromov preferred to work with journalists without mentioning his last name, preferring to hide behind faceless people:
“The president’s press service noted.” Gromov has a reputation as a person from whom it is difficult to extract any information beyond the official ones. He is quite intolerant of, in his opinion, incorrect criticism of the press service, but he preferred to sort things out with the authors rather than with the editors-in-chief.
Participated in the preparation and conduct of almost all of Boris Yeltsin’s trips abroad. He could argue for hours with foreign partners about equal access for Russian journalists to various events with the participation of the Russian president. There is a known case when, on the initiative of Alexei Gromov, a meeting between Yeltsin and Clinton was delayed for 10 minutes, because the Americans pushed through one of their extra journalists.
Alexey Gromov appeared in the presidential administration at the invitation of former press secretary Sergei Yastrzhembsky, with whom he worked at the Russian Embassy in Bratislava. Gromov maintains equal relations with his colleagues, but at the same time does not tolerate interference in his area of activity. He maintains the closest relations with people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Deputy Head of the Administration for Foreign Policy Sergei Prikhodko and Head of the Presidential Protocol Department Igor Semyonov.
In her work she invariably adheres to the Regulations on the Office of the Press Service.
What is a press secretary for a Very Important Person? First of all, this is a person who “covers the rear” and “throws himself at the embrasure.” More likely, even the second, if only we give this expression a less sinister meaning.
The press secretary not only communicates with the press and sifts through a sieve (the size of the cells depends on the rank of the person whose interests the press secretary represents) certain media for their loyalty, but also replaces the boss himself at certain events in order to give appropriate commentary on topic. Because it is impossible to embrace the immensity. And the VIP status must correspond to the status of the event. Or vice versa. Speaking about Alexei Gromov, the most important Russian press secretary, we see a paradoxical situation - few Russians can identify him by sight and last name. Gromov looks like an eminence grise. It is accessible everywhere, but the functionality and merits of bureaucratic creative activity can only be discerned and determined by an analyst of remarkable intelligence. So it turns out that the conversation can only be about the president. Based on the analysis of what is happening in the press around Putin and his name, one can judge by what is being done and has been done for his PR by Gromov as his representative for the media.
The media showing the president is primarily an ideology. And the last one too. Ideology and propaganda. But if we talk about, say, Channel One, then often the number of mentions of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin does not translate into quality. But it is Alexey Alekseevich Gromov who has been on the board of directors of Channel One OJSC since 1994. The second, also a government and state television channel, RTR, is heavily overloaded with protocol, while not providing explanations or comments. And when the viewer does not understand what certain meetings or visits mean to HIM PERSONALLY, then this rather works against the president, who becomes an incomprehensible figure. And most importantly, his actions are also incomprehensible.
TV channels must take into account that the president communicates at the political level, at the level of high awareness of the surrounding situation, and if he addresses the Federal Assembly, he is understandable, but his words need to be explained to the population. And apparently it is the press secretary who should monitor the implementation of this by the channels.
The clear and undeniable merit of Alexei Gromov, in terms of shaping the image of the president, if we assume that he was “primarily” involved in this, is that Putin began to fly less on planes, sail on ships and generally directly participate in certain events .
The image of the president must be weighed. If we talk about the sequence in which the public should be informed, then some technical or even dramatic details should come before the president. And any text spoken by the president is political. And it takes, as they say, five minutes to think and breathe.
But the other side of the coin is not for the president to engage in prompt commentary, except in some extreme situations.
The president has become less of a game show figure and more of a figure who is trying to analyze the situation. And this is correct, because if we look overseas, we will see that the presidents there are 80% showmen. The President should be moderately boring. It's not bad.
This is a sign of stability. If the president spends all his time conducting an orchestra, like Yeltsin, or flying a fighter jet to Chechnya, then at some point a fair question may arise - what is happening? Because any such emotion in the media is a kind of drug. And when the viewer gets hooked on it, then next time we need to do something even brighter.
The President cannot be the hero of the show. The analytical nature of the president should provide for the heaviness of his political statements, in the good sense of heaviness, in the sense of weight, the authority of his political statements should provide for the seriousness of the analytical field around these statements. But this does not happen.
In general, please note that when talking about Alexei Gromov, we are talking mainly about Putin. Gromov is the shadow of a charismatic leader, helping him stay in the spotlight while remaining invisible. Although, this is more of an assistant role rather than a press secretary.
Let's return to the formation of the analytical field. Who should build it? Media employees or the presidential press service? It turns out that in general such a concept as “presidential press service” is noticed only by pool journalists.
Alexei Gromov is almost never heard. Therefore, it is difficult to talk about any kind of press service at all. She performs a fairly technical role. It was fun under Yeltsin. One press secretary was bathed in a Siberian river, the other had to speak and prove that the boss actually didn’t say anything like that, he was just misunderstood. Now there is no such need. Well, thank God. Everything began to look more dignified and calmer. The image of the president is strengthened and working.
Not for the first time and with constant success. Isn’t this the merit of Alexei Gromov and his staff? And his invisibility is his trump card in this case. And if someone makes jokes - they say that Gromov is visible only when he comments on personal meetings of the greats with their spouses, where mere mortal journalists are not allowed (as recently, when Bush and his wife flew in), then it is possible that it is out of envy.
Invisibility in this case is not obvious. If we analyze the political ratings, Gromov is with enviable regularity one of the 100 most influential Russian politicians. So much for stealth. And in general, this is where talent lies, the art of creating a reputation for the First Person while remaining a shadow. Invisible and unnoticeable.
BIOGRAPHY
Gromov Alexey Alekseevich was born in 1960 in Zagorsk (Sergiev Posad), Moscow region. Education - In 1982 he graduated from the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. M. V. Lomonosov, Department of Southern and Western Slavs.
Marital status: Married. Has two children.
In 1982-1996 he worked at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Foreign Ministry;
1982-1985 - Secretary of the Consulate General of the USSR in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia;
1985-1988 - attaché at the USSR Embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia;
1988-1991 - third, second secretary of the secretariat of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;
1991-1992 - First Secretary of the General Secretariat of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation;
1992-1993 - Consul of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Bratislava, Slovakia;
1993-1996 - Counselor at the Russian Embassy in Bratislava, Slovakia.
In 1996-2000, he worked as head of the press service, then as head of the Office of the Press Service of the President of the Russian Federation.
Speaks Czech, Slovak and English.
Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation. He was appointed to this post in January 2000 and re-appointed in March 2004.
In 1996-2000, he was the head of the press service and information department in the presidential administration of the Russian Federation.
In 1983-1996 he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the USSR. He was a minister-counselor and consul in Slovakia. Member of the board of directors of OJSC Channel One, initiator of the creation and curator of the English-language channel Russia Today (RTTV).
In his family, three generations of men bore the name Alexey. In 1982, Gromov graduated from the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University. He specialized in the department of Southern and Western Slavs. During his studies, he was a Komsomol activist and commissar of the university voluntary squad. The commander of this detachment was the future businessman and politician Konstantin Zatulin, who in 1996 created and headed the Institute of CIS Countries.
After graduating from the university, Gromov received a referral to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1983-1985 he was secretary of the USSR Consulate General in Karlovy Vary in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR), in 1985-1988 - attaché of the Soviet embassy in Prague. In 1989 he returned to Moscow, worked in the central office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the third, then second secretary. In 1991, he became the first secretary of the general secretariat of the foreign policy department.
In 1992, Gromov was appointed consul of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in the Slovak Republic. At the same time, the Russian ambassador to this country was Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who in 2004 became President Vladimir Putin’s representative on the development of relations with the European Union. In 1993, Gromov became a counselor-envoy of the Russian embassy in Slovakia (the second official after the ambassador). The media noted that just at this time the process of division of the Czech Republic and Slovakia was being completed, and Gromov and Yastrzhembsky represented the Russian Federation during it.
On November 22, 1996, Gromov was appointed head of the press service and information department of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation. The media associated this appointment with the fact that in August of the same year, Yastrzhembsky, who oversaw the work of the press service department, became the press secretary of the re-elected President Boris Yeltsin. The appointment of Yastrzhembsky, according to media reports, took place on the initiative of the head of the presidential administration Anatoly Chubais (since 1998, head of RAO UES of Russia).
Major works and awards
Winner of the Ogonyok magazine award “for ensuring information openness of the Kremlin” (2000).
FULL NAME: Gromov Alexey Alekseevich
Date of Birth: May 31, 1960, Zagorsk, Moscow region
Position held: Russian politician, first deputy head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation.
Leaks of information about the beginning of such a confrontation appeared quite a long time ago, even after the New Year, when sources in the sector of the first deputy head of administration overseeing the internal affairs said that a study ordered by their colleagues showed the ineffectiveness of the current way of working of central television channels and the harmfulness of all the so-called political talk shows, long gone from meaningful discussion.
source:
The editors-in-chief of Russia's largest media regularly attend "strategic meetings" held by representatives of the Putin administration. It's like Fight Club: no one acknowledges its existence, but given the level of consistency in the coverage of popular TV shows across the three major networks, its existence seems obvious.
source:
In December 2014, the Sputnik agency was created, working in several languages. It was created in record time and received record, by Western standards, funding - 113 million euros or 7 billion rubles. This project was conceived and created by Mikhail Lesin, “one of the participants in the massacre of the Media-Most group” 15 years ago. His unexpected death in a Washington hotel still raises questions.
source:
There are 20 people on the new list. Among them are presidential assistant Andrei Fursenko, head of the presidential administration, businessman, leader of A Just Russia Sergei Mironov, State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin, businessman Gennady Timchenko (head of the Volga Group and co-owner of the oil trader Gunvor), head of Russian Railways Vladimir Yakunin, State Duma deputy Sergei Zheleznyak, businessmen Arkady and (own a share in Mostotrest and other assets), First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Alexei Gromov, Presidential Administration Manager Vladimir Kozhin. The complete list is contained in the document of the US Treasury.
link:
Vyacheslav Volodin and Alexey Gromov remained the first deputy heads of the administration. Former chief of staff of the Russian government Anton Vaino and V. Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov, who simultaneously headed the presidential press service, were appointed deputy heads of administration.
Read completely:
Before this, Gromov, who will turn 52 at the end of May, worked for four years as deputy head of the Kremlin administration. In this post, he oversaw the presidential press service and information department, as well as the protocol and organizational department of the head of state. From 2000 to 2008, Gromov worked as the president's press secretary.
link:
Instead of a preface: after the publication of this material, the same evening the hoster of The Insider website (Locum.ru) terminated the contract with us. The Insider changed the hoster to a more reliable one (alas, we had to abandon “domestic manufacturers”). Unfortunately, until Tuesday (January 27), the site may not yet be operational for many providers, for which we apologize to readers. But every cloud has a silver lining - now our site will work faster and more reliably.
Yesterday Anonymous International posted a new batch of letters from the mailbox Timur Prokopenko, Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Policy of the Presidential Administration (see the first episode here). This time they also feature the gray cardinal Alexey Gromov, AP consultant Dmitry Badovsky with his reports, the permanent Kristina Potupchik with her magical creativity and many others. The correspondence also made it possible to find out that Prokopenko wrote to his opponents from an anonymous Twitter, how the Ministry of Education fought with Duma member Burmatov for “ordering” in the media, how Roskomnadzor reported to the Administration for blocking Navalny’s resources and much more equally informative information.
Gromov wags the dog
Alexey Gromov
For example, Gromov sends a text dedicated to the recall of the Russian ambassador from Washington:
Text about the recall of the Russian ambassador from Washington
These words were voiced very close to the text, looking at a piece of paper, by Vice Speaker Yuri Vorobyov in the Federation Council. But here’s the catch: the Itar-Tass agency was the first to quote at 18:56. And Gromov sent the letter at 18:52. It seems that he knew in advance the contents of the piece of paper that Vorobyov was looking into, and moreover, apparently Gromov wrote this piece of paper.
The directive from Gromov arrived at 18:52
No less interesting is Gromov’s letter in which he, without any comment, sends Prokopenko screenshots of the hacked VKontakte account of Ukrainian nationalist Dmitry Yarosh. After the hack, calls to organize terrorist attacks in Russia appeared on his page, as well as a post supporting terrorist Doku Umarov (who had already died by that time). As soon as these posts were posted, the Kremlin media actively picked up the theme of “Yarosh the extremist”, and very quickly the corresponding post appeared on Ramzan Kadyrov’s Instagram. Even then, many put forward the version that the Presidential Administration was involved in the hack; Gromov’s letter is another argument in favor of this version.
Letter from Gromov
Control over the media. The dependence of the “independent” and the restraint of “Kommersant”
Badovsky's letter
Either Prokopenko got it wrong, or decided differently, but Mironov was eventually published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and Chernyakhovsky in Dni.ru:
Publication based on the results of correspondence
But if everything has long been clear with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, then here is a letter from the (at that time) editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Kommersant" It was strange to see Mikhail Mikhailin in this correspondence. Pay attention to point 5: “We will write opponents in the newspaper as discreetly as possible.”
It is also interesting that the correspondence reveals the history of the Mediametrix service, which positions itself as an independent project that allows tracking the most discussed news on social networks. The Insider knew from its sources that the Presidential Administration was involved in the project, and now this information has been confirmed:
Prokopenko writes about Mediametrix - “This is our product”
Battle jeans. Ministry of Education vs. Presidential Administration
“After Usacheva joined the Ministry of Education as press secretary, the publication of materials related to the investigation of violations of the law in the activities of the ministry became significantly more difficult. At the same time, the department still does not provide comments to the media on the results of these investigations, but is focused on removing publications and blocking their publication. Simultaneously, through structures subordinate to the Ministry of Education, large sums were transferred to consulting companies providing relevant services (contract for Mikhailov and Partners through Rosobrnadzor, etc.)
As a result, the situation in news agencies: Interfax does not publish any materials containing a hint of criticism of the ministry or negative information as “not consistent with editorial policy”; Until recently, RIA Novosti published approximately one out of three news items; for the last 3-4 weeks, they have blocked critical news regarding the Ministry of Education completely (at the same time, the correspondents prepare them regularly, and the editor does not let them through); ITAR TASS until recently put everything at all, but in the last 3-4 weeks the situation has changed to a complete blocking of any criticism of the department. The materials are also not edited. All this coincided with the Ministry of Education transferring money to consulting firms.
The situation with Izvestia: until recently, the most significant and resonant topics were leaked through the newspaper. For the last 3-4 weeks, the releases have been malfunctioning (materials are transferred, appear only on the website without publication in “paper”, or are removed altogether). In this case, we are talking about written articles with comments from experts, which have been edited and even put into layout. Before this, everything happened following a call from Usacheva to the editor-in-chief (or after her visits to the editorial office). The last time material on a minister’s criminal case was removed was after Usacheva’s call Gabrelyanov(although the material was already in the layout and was being edited). A copy of the material is attached.
The United Russia website, where previously it was possible to release news most quickly, has put a complete block on negative or critical information about the ministry.
As a result, the tools now available are small agencies such as the National News Service, with which there are personal agreements, but whose coverage is small, as well as direct mailing to the media, which does not work well because it is perceived as “spam.”
At the same time, the number of topics is constantly increasing, and we are talking specifically about the results of inspections with relevant documents from the prosecutor's office, the Accounts Chamber, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Antimonopoly Service and other departments. A significant part of the information is insider information, provided by the employees of the Ministry of Education and subordinate organizations themselves and is also supported by documents. A number of topics prepared for publication are presented below.
Dmitry Livanov
1. A failed attempt for the third time to hush up the “Livanov case” (the case of embezzlement of budget funds at MISiS on an especially large scale). The investigation of the prosecutor's office was completed, the decision to close the case was canceled as illegal, episodes were added to the case proving the involvement of the minister (orders signed by him). The material is completely ready for publication (the article in Izvestia was removed after Usacheva’s call to Gabrelyanov, although it was already in the layout). The Ministry of Education refuses to comment on the material (although Izvestia offered them this in advance - to express their position), because there are documents directly pointing to the minister when concluding contracts, there are corresponding conclusions of the Accounts Chamber and the prosecutor's office.
2. Results of the audit by the Accounts Chamber of the Ministry of Education (as part of the control activities of the joint venture in the field of federal budget expenditures). Based on the results of the audit, in particular, it turned out that the Ministry of Education is the “champion” among departments in the number of undeveloped normative legal acts on key issues of the ministry’s activities, in particular, 19 normative acts regulating the procedure for forming a federal system for training and retraining of teaching staff have not been developed ; the procedure for the formation of the material, technical, experimental and instrumental base of science; the procedure for providing special state scholarships for education to citizens who have demonstrated outstanding abilities, including scholarships for studying abroad; and more than a dozen other important regulations. In addition, the joint venture identified other systemic violations in the activities of the Ministry of Education. There is a corresponding conclusion from the Accounts Chamber; there was a preliminary agreement with Izvestia about publication on Friday (4.04), which was also cancelled.
3. The real situation with the deprivation of licenses of “ineffective” universities: the results of the analysis of the procedure for depriving licenses, which was entrusted to the Ministry of Education by the Prime Minister. The instruction of the Ministry of Education was not fulfilled: only a few licenses were actually revoked, and “more than a hundred universities deprived of licenses” is a figure taken over several years, when universities themselves refused licenses due to economic inexpediency. Now this is presented as the result of work. The analysis was prepared with all the details by the employees of Rosobrnadzor themselves, who wanted to reveal the situation so as not to fall under the distribution later. The preliminary agreement on publication was with Izvestia.
4. The results of the prosecutor's audit regarding the failure to implement the Electronic Higher Attestation Commission project, for which more than 80 million rubles were allocated, and which was not launched in 2012, despite the fact that Livanov’s department reported a successful launch in all instances and in the media. An inspection by the prosecutor's office confirmed missed deadlines and other violations. The information is ready for publication.
5. Misuse of funds for “paying experts” by the Ministry of Education during the accreditation of universities, the use of experts who do not have the appropriate rights to conduct accreditation activities, overexpenditure of funds allocated for experts. The information was prepared by department employees themselves and is ready for publication.
6. Violations of the Ministry of Education during the implementation of FTPRO projects in 2013 (misappropriation, official forgery, negligence). Inflating the cost of orders by tens of millions of rubles. The documents were provided by the department employees themselves, the materials are ready for publication.
7. Completion of an audit by the prosecutor’s office and the Federal Antimonopoly Service regarding the transfer of 200 million rubles. to the accounts of shell companies that unopposedly won competitions of the Ministry of Education in 2012-2013. in violation of Federal Law 94. The deadline for completing the inspections is April 2014.
8. Completion of the prosecutor’s investigation into the transfer of funds from the Ministry of Education to “phantom companies”, the information about which, presented in the competition documentation, was false. The audit deadline is April 2014.
9. The creation by officials of the Ministry of Education of companies engaged in “guaranteed preparation” for the Unified State Exam (in fact, as expected, trading in exam results). In particular, a similar affiliated company was found at the head of Rosobrnadzor Kravtsov. The deadline for collecting supporting documentation is April 2014.
Offers:
1. Restore working contact with Izvestia and one or two of the agencies (RIA Novosti, ITAR TASS) at the editorial level. The required “power” is the publication of 8-10 large topics per month, like those presented above, and 4-6 “situational” topics related to a prompt response to problems (Unified State Examination, monitoring of universities, inadequate orders of the ministry, etc. )
2. Speech at a ten-minute meeting and approach to the press in the Duma on the topic of corruption in the department (detailed analysis of 3-4 related corruption scandals in the department)
3. If possible, restore contact with the EP website for the publication of all news.”
Ksenzov vs. Navalny
Letter from Ksenzov
And indeed. for some time it was possible to close a number of propaganda resources, including Lifenews, which caused Gabrelyanov’s indignation.
The website navalny.us bypasses Roskomnadzor bans because it does not contain any materials, but only forwards it to Navalny’s real blog (which opens in a new location each time). After a number of unsuccessful attempts to close the mirrors, Ksenzov gave up and the navalny.us website is still working.
Internal showdowns. Prokopenko vs. Belokonev
Prokopenko laid out dirt on Belokonevon its website zashkvar.com
It is curious that Prokopenko will not say a word about this publicly, and a month and a half after this gift, Belokonev will resign. It seems that 8.6 million became a kind of compensation for him. However, Prokopenko himself is not in poverty - as follows from the correspondence, he always flies in business class, and this fighter for patriotic education certainly demanded an Audi A8 as a work car.
Prokopenko always flies business class
"Polite man." Prokopenko takes off his mask
This is how he talks with Ekaterina Vinokurova (a journalist who often communicates with the Administration of Internal Policy, where Prokopenko is a deputy):
Messages from Prokopenko to Ekaterina Vinokurova
This is how Prokopenko communicates with gallery owner Marat Gelman:
Prokopenko's altercation with gallery owner Marat Gelman
This is what he writes to journalist Tikhon Dzyadko:
Prokopenko hurls insults at Tikhon Dzyadko
And this is how he responds to the head of the Apostol company, Tina Kandelaki:
"Compliments" to Tina Kandelaki...
...And PR of your own website
How Badovsky calculated consultants and bloggers
Dmitry Badovsky
This letter was sent by Badovsky on May 1, and exactly 2 weeks later, Izvestia reported on a bill to ban foreign consulting companies from serving government agencies, and the bill included exactly the same 6 consulting companies that were presented in Badovsky’s report. Since the state of mental health of Deputy Fedorov (who is also the leader of the Russian titushki from the NOD) is a debatable issue, it is difficult to say whether this bill was an improvisation or an order, but the coincidence itself seems curious.
It was Badovsky who sent the project on “Internet control” to the AP, the idea of which was voiced three days later at a meeting with Putin by AP blogger Viktor Levanov (Then Putin responded that the Internet was a CIA project).
Some of Badovsky’s reports look very funny; for example, this is how he imagines the blogosphere’s reaction to the invasion of Crimea:
However, even such analytics looks serious, against the backdrop of reports from the regular hero of our latest materials - Christina Potupchik, about it in the next section.
"Vladimir the Restorer" and other creative Potupchik
In a previous article, The Insider already wrote about the practice of denunciations that Potupchik made against opposition media if, from her point of view, they did not cover events as needed. Here are a few more examples, this time about the publication Lenta.ru.
Here are excerpts from the late February report:
Potupchik's denunciation about Lenta.ru
And here's a few days later:
Potupchik writes to the AP before the dismissal of Lenta's editor-in-chief
It is noteworthy that Potupchik came to this conclusion a few days before editor-in-chief Galina Timchenko was dismissed and after her the entire team left the editorial office.
In addition to denunciations, Prokopenko’s mail is full of examples of propaganda work from Kristina Potupchik. Here, for example, is a luxurious example of Kremlin creativity: Vladimir the Reducer (note, not an oxidizing agent, not a solvent, but a reducing agent).
Clumsy propaganda from Kristina Potupchik
And here is another sample of propaganda from which we learn why Vladimir the Restorer needed Crimea - there is simply a lot of gas and oil there:
Creative Potupchik about Crimea...
And here is a stunningly convincing argument in favor of the fact that Russian elections are the fairest:
...And about elections
Suddenly in the mail Potupchik - infographics on the palaces of our officials. Obviously, Christina simply meant that Volodin’s mansion is not that big, it’s quite a medium-sized mansion:
Infographics on palaces of officials (full size -)
The sharp critical reaction of neutral users to the events in Crimea in connection with the fall in the ruble exchange rate raises concerns. Comments from economists on the currency’s readiness to stabilize and positive economic forecasts are needed for dissemination in the media and support in blogs.
It is worth disseminating information about the imminent bankruptcy of Dozhd as much as possible, accompanying it with an indication of the wealth of its owner Vinokurov, and the fact that Dozhd was actually bankrupt by him in the same way as his previous asset - the KIT-Finance bank. It turns out that Vinokurov treats government subsidies with the same disregard as he treats his own team of like-minded oppositionists, striving exclusively for his own enrichment.
The guards should continue to criticize Alexei Navalny for his proposed expansion of the list of Russian politicians who may be affected by Western sanctions. A number of security guards and liberals have already criticized him for this, but the discussion may well continue, especially against the background of the successful information background that accompanied Putin’s message and the signing of the agreement on the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.
A wide wave of reaction was caused by the dismissal of historian Zubov from MGIMO. The main reason for criticism was MGIMO's direct statement that Zubov was fired for his position on Crimea, which the university management considered possible to interfere with the educational process. It is advisable to try to somehow smooth out the situation, to motivate the dismissal with additional objective reasons that are not related to Zubov’s position, but reflect his objective professional suitability.
The guards should be ironic about the massive support for Makarevich, for whom top opposition figures stood up. It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that many real and pressing problems do not receive such attention, and Andrei Makarevich, a regular guest of “Russia Days” and corporate events of state-owned companies, does not at all need such protection.
It is necessary to stop speculation on the topic of possible Western control of the price of oil, which could lead to its decrease and, as a result, a budget deficit. Clarification of the pricing system for export products will be able to remove the ground from under the offensive rhetoric of the opposition. The actions of Bank Russia should be covered in the same explanatory vein - not as a one-time PR campaign, as it is perceived by the environment, and not as protection from sanctions, but as part of a single process to create a protected economy in the Eurasian space.
The active campaign raised by the opposition to bypass the blocking requires measures not only of an organizational nature, like the warnings of the prosecutor's office, which obviously will not be implemented. The majority of the audience does not have the technical competence to create a system for bypassing blocking and use ready-made software products in the form of special programs and browser add-ons. It is advisable to consider the possibility of equating such programs and plugins to malware.
Regarding the topic of the lawsuit against Shenderovich, it is worth pointing out that the “old Jew” does not want to part with his money and hides behind his 80-year-old mother-in-law. Suitable for use by the most radical bloggers
Security guards should pay attention and support Ksenia Sobchak’s information that Boris Nemtsov is not going to return to Russia from Israel due to the criminal case brought against him. Despite Nemtsov’s hasty denial, it is worth remembering how similar information was refuted by Garry Kasparov, who is now fighting the regime from abroad.
You also need to pay attention to Durov’s statement about FSB pressure - such statements must be refuted with meaningful references to the numerous violations that these communities had according to the rules of VKontakte itself, as well as Russian legislation, which was completely ignored by the administration of the resource.
It should be noted that a separate story happened to Potupchik with Durov. On April 1, a letter with the following content was sent from Potupchik mail to journalists and colleagues:
Dear friends and foes.
Today, the man whom I admired throughout our confrontation left his post, unable to withstand the pressure that we organized for him.
I'm talking about Pavel Durov.
We put pressure on him and on the shareholders of VKontakte throughout 2012, 2013 and 2014 - Pavel resisted, but apparently he had reached a stage where there was no longer any moral strength to agree with us and introduce public and private restrictions for VKontakte users.
I admire what Paul did.
Now I went into my mail and found a letter from one of the meetings between us and curators from the Internal Policy Department of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and Vkontakte shareholders.
I am forwarding this letter to a wide list of recipients.
Bloggers and journalists. The letter contains all the data from which it is clear that this is not a fake; a file based on the results of the meeting is attached.
Tomorrow or even today I will claim that my email was hacked by hackers, perhaps some of them will even take responsibility
Lewis Carroll im judge
I want to be honest sometimes, at least to myself
It seems that it is now obvious to everyone who exactly actually sent out this letter on behalf of Potupchik. [...]
Alexey Alekseevich Gromov is the first deputy head of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, a member of the board of directors of Channel One, the initiator of the creation and curator of the Russia Today TV channel. From 2000 to 2008 he was the press secretary of President Vladimir Putin.Gromov graduated from school in the Moscow region and entered the history department of Moscow State University. During his institute years, Alexey Alekseevich was an active Komsomol member; for a year he was a commissar of the Komsomol operational detachment under the leadership of Konstantin Zatulin, who subsequently, in 1993, became a deputy of the State Duma of the first convocation, and in 1996 created and led the Institute of the CIS Countries.
In 1988, the diplomat returned home, taking the position of first third and then second secretary in the secretariat of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. In 1991, he was promoted to First Secretary of the General Secretariat of the USSR Foreign Ministry (then the Russian Foreign Ministry), where he worked until 1992.
In 1992, Gromov went to Slovakia, where he worked as Consul General at the Russian Consulate. From 1993 to 1996, he served as counselor at the Russian Embassy in Slovakia.
In August 1996, Gromov's colleague at the Foreign Ministry, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, was appointed press secretary of Boris Yeltsin. Many associated this fact with the imminent appointment of Alexei Gromov to the position of head of the Office of the Press Service of the President of the Russian Federation, since this department was controlled by Yastrzhembsky. Two years later, Alexey Alekseevich headed the press service department of the Presidential Administration.
In January 2000, Vladimir Putin, at that time acting. President of the Russian Federation, appointed Gromov as his press secretary. When Vladimir Vladimirovich was elected president of the Russian Federation, Alexey Gromov continued his work as press secretary of the legally elected president. In the same year, Alexey Alekseevich Gromov was awarded and recognized as a laureate of the Ogonyok magazine prize “for ensuring the Kremlin’s information openness.”
In 2001, Alexey Alekseevich joined the board of directors of OJSC ORT (since 2004 Channel One).
After the election of Vladimir Putin for a second term, press secretary Gromov retained his post, and since 2005 oversaw the activities of the English-language channel Russia Today, which, by the way, was created precisely on his initiative (together with Mikhail Lesin); he appointed former Kremlin correspondent Margarita Simonyan as leader.
In 2008, after Dmitry Medvedev was elected president, Alexey Gromov was appointed deputy to Sergei Naryshkin, head of the presidential administration. In May 2012, Alexey Alekseevich was promoted to First Deputy.
In 2014, the United States and the EU added his name to the sanctions list of individuals prohibited from crossing the border with the United States.
Those who were lucky enough to work with Alexei Gromov speak of him as a firm and tough boss. It is known that the politician has a wife - Anna Vitalievna Gromova, a candidate of historical sciences and chairman of the supervisory board of the Elisabeth-Sergius Educational Society (ESPO Foundation).
The couple raised two sons. According to tradition, one of them was named Alexey, the second is named Danila.
Due to his work, Alexey Gromov is fluent in three foreign languages: English, Czech and Slovak.
Alexey Alekseevich – collector. Despite the seriousness of his profession, his hobby is quite funny - he collects figurines of gnomes.
Alexey Gromov at the Chinese Embassy
In 2016, Alexey Gromov continued to work as First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. The main area of his activity is the regulation of information policy, namely print media and television. He has a Kremlin registration and his own personal account.
